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Chapter 2
A Model of Critical Thinking in Higher
Education
Martin Davies
Part 1: The Individual Axis
Introduction
“Critical thinking in higher education” is a phrase that means many things to many
people. It is a broad church. Does it mean a propensity for finding fault? Does it
refer to an analytical method? Does it mean an ethical attitude or a disposition?
Does it mean all of the above? Educating to develop critical intellectuals and the
Marxist concept of critical consciousness are very different from the logician’s
toolkit of finding fallacies in passages of text, or the practice of identifying and
distinguishing valid from invalid syllogisms. Critical thinking in higher education
can also encompass debates about critical pedagogy, i.e., political critiques of the
role and function of education in society, critical feminist approaches to curriculum,
issues related to what has become known as critical citizenship, or any other
education-related topic that uses the appellation “critical”. Equally, it can, and
usually does, refer to the importance and centrality of developing general skills in
reasoning—skills that we hope all graduates possess. Yet, despite more than four
decades of dedicated scholarly work “critical thinking” remains as elusive as ever.
As a concept, it is, as Raymond Williams has noted, a ‘most difficult one’ (Williams,
1976, p. 74).
M. Davies, Ph.D. ()
Melbourne Graduate School of Education, University of Melbourne, 234 Queensbury Street,
Carlton, VIC, Australia
e-mail: wmdavies@unimelb.edu.au
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
M.B. Paulsen (ed.), Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research,
Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research 30,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-12835-1_2
41
42 M. Davies
How should we account for these issues when we—i.e., academics, educators,
employers, interested others—make bold claims about the importance of our
students developing “critical thinking”? There is little doubt that critical thinking
in higher education involves all of the elements noted above. But what sense can be
made of this? Critical thinking cannot be all things to all people; this would mean
the phrase does little useful scholarly work.
Traditional philosophical definitions of the concept of “critical thinking”—
which I shall outline shortly—do not necessarily inform debates in these very
different areas of critical thinking scholarship. Definitions of critical thinking are
not central to areas such as critical pedagogy or critical feminism. Learning about
them does not help one develop a critical attitude about the society in which one
lives. Philosophical definitions of critical thinking do not assist in becoming a
critical citizen. However, in another sense, the core attributes of critical thinking
canvassed in these definitions will always remain fundamental to what we mean
by “critical thinking”. At a very basic level, critical thinking is about having skills
of a certain sort (inference making, reasoning, and so on). Yet, critical thinking is
also much more than this. Traditional philosophical definitions of critical thinking
seem impotent in relation to these wider areas of critical thinking scholarship as
they apply to the discipline of Higher Education.
Whether critical thinking can and should be taught is as contested as the concept
of “critical thinking” itself. Again, any answer to these questions depends very much
on what one means by “critical thinking”. Many would concur that teaching the
skill of recognizing and constructing arguments—i.e., critical thinking as reasoning
skills—is valuable and important. However, educating for radical social and political
change (i.e., “critical pedagogy”) may be seen as less desirable. Others are not happy
with the teaching of critical thinking in any form. Consider, for example, the recent
Texas Republican Party policy that explicitly tried to ban the teaching of critical
thinking in schools (Strauss, 2012). Banning something is premised on a clear
understanding of the thing one is trying to ban. But what exactly did the Republicans
want to ban? This was not obvious. Little progress on the topic of critical thinking
in higher education can be made if the concept itself remains unmoored from any
proper theoretical and conceptual grounding. Little progress can be made if “critical
thinking” remains un-theorized. Perhaps this is why critical thinking is said to be
‘one of the defining concepts in Western education which enjoys wide endorsement,
yet we have no proper account of it’ (Barnett, 1997, p. 1).
It is probably about time that we had such an account. Accordingly, this two-part
paper aims to provide a holistic conception of the various theoretical approaches to
critical thinking as it is used in the discipline of Higher Education. I develop a model
of critical thinking in higher education that pays due recognition to the antecedent
work done by others (in the so-called “critical thinking movement”, and elsewhere),
and yet which provides a place for work being done in a variety of fields residing at
the periphery of traditional critical thinking scholarship in Higher Education.
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Models of Critical Thinking
Building on the work of Barnett (1997), the suggestion is that critical thinking in
higher education has at least six distinct, yet integrated and permeable, dimensions
(see Part 2, “A model of critical thinking in higher education”). These range
from: (1) core skills in critical argumentation (reasoning and inference-making),
(2) critical judgments, (3) critical thinking dispositions and attitudes, (4) critical
actions, (5) critical social relations, and (6) what I, and others (notably, Burbules &
Berk, 1999), call “critical creativity”, “critical openness”, or critical being. Each
of these, I submit, has an important place in an overarching model of critical
thinking. The model I propose will demonstrate that critical thinking has both an
individual, as well as a socio-cultural dimension—both comprising axes in the
model—and admits of at least six distinct, dimensions of critical thinking: i.e.,
as skills, judgments, dispositions, actions, social relations and critical being. This
helps in developing a theory of critical thinking in higher education, with due
acknowledgment to past and present approaches to the topic. This has the potential
to assist in making headway on the variety of critical thinking concerns that exist in
the field of Higher Education today.
There are many well-developed extant models of critical thinking. They might
be called “philosophical” models of critical thinking. They range from the tried
and tested taxonomy of educational objectives, with its contemporary variations
(Airasian et al., 2001; Bloom, 1956) to the Collegiate Learning Assessment, APA
Delphi and Paul-Elder models (Facione, 1990; Paul & Elder, 2001; Sadler, 2010).
There are also models of critical thinking in relation to cognitive decision-making
(Ennis, 1991). However, these models are used mostly in educating for critical
thinking; i.e., aiming to provide a solid cognitive foundation for judgment formation
and decision-making. However, critical thinking in higher education is a different
beast, serving as it does, the entire interdisciplinary field of Higher Education,
and the wider concerns of educators’ attitudes to criticality. Concerns about
argumentation, judgment formation and decision-making that bears on educating
for criticality also apply to critical thinking in higher education, but the latter has a
wider brief.
It is the latter which is my main focus. Just as critical thinking has a different
place in the various disciplines—critical thinking in the sciences is different from the
professions—so too there is unique place for critical thinking in Higher Education.
In this paper I attempt to locate this place. Any account of the place of critical
thinking in higher education needs to make sense, for example, of how critical
thinking is represented in debates about critical pedagogy, the role of education
in leading to individual and collective socio-political activism, the place of critical
thinking in educating for citizenship, the role of critical thinking in relation to
creativity, and so on. Any such account of critical thinking must also account for
the traditional focus of critical thinking as a composite of skills and judgments, and
as a variety of dispositions as well. A model of critical thinking in higher education
is needed that incorporates all these concerns.
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These varied higher educational concerns, I suggest, are not well-served by
present models of critical thinking. The latter have a very different, and circum-
scribed, purpose. While philosophical accounts of critical thinking may be necessary
in relation to one important purpose in higher education (teaching important
cognitive skills), they are not sufficient in accounting for the place of critical thinking
in the discipline of Higher Education. The latter is what I aim to provide in this
paper.
The Place of Critical Thinking in Higher Education
What is the place of critical thinking in higher education? At one level critical
thinking is all about the development of certain sorts of skills. These include skills
in argumentation, and skills in making sound judgments. Employers want evidence
of critical thinking skills in their employees, and graduates are assumed to possess
these skills. However, skills without the disposition to use them are not much use,
so critical thinking is about dispositions as well. Critical thinking, as both skills and
dispositions, is mainly about the development of the individual. We might call this
the individual dimension of critical thinking.
Critical thinking in this sense is needed by industry as much as academia. But,
of course, society also demands individual critical thinking skills and dispositions
as these are important for employment and wider social and political engagement.
Critical thinking is, therefore, both an individual attribute and beneficial to society.
Can we say then, that critical thinking is a social aspiration as well, i.e., that it has a
social dimension?
Theorists that promulgate views in what has become known as critical pedagogy
think that critical thinking is as much about changing society, and conditions
of social oppression, as much as demonstrating individual skills in reasoning,
argumentation and judgments. They regard belief claims, for example, ‘not merely
as a propositions to be assessed for their truth content, but as part of systems of
belief and action that have aggregate effects within the power structures of society.
It asks first about these systems of belief and action, who benefits?’ (Burbules &
Berk, 1999, p. 47). Their focus is not on individual skills and dispositions as much
as the social and political relevance of arguments and reasoning. Questioning power
relationships in society must, they argue, be considered a central part of critical
thinking (Kaplan, 1991).
Similarly, scholars that write about what has become known as critical demo-
cratic citizenship education have a very different account of critical thinking. Given
that critical thinking has a social and political dimension, it is not unreasonable
for it to have a dimension of inter-personal socially-appropriate caring as well
(Noddings, 1992). In order to cultivate critical citizens, they argue, ‘instructional
designs are needed that do not capitalize on applying tricks of arguing, nor
on the cognitive activity of analyzing power structures, but contribute : : : in
a meaningful and critical way in concrete real social practices and activities’
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(Ten Dam & Volman, 2004, p. 371). They argue that learning to think critically
should—in part at least—be conceptualized as ‘the acquisition of the competence
to participate critically in the communities and social practices of which a person is
a member’ (Ten Dam & Volman, p. 375). This kind of educational aim, naturally,
has an impact on the development of critical character and virtue. A good “citizen”,
they suggest, should be more than an individual, who is well-appraised of skills
in argumentation with the capacity to form sound judgments, but a socially-adept
and virtuous person, caring in nature, with the capacity to consider the interests and
needs of his fellow man. Critical thinking therefore has moral as well as cultural
characteristics. We might call this the socio-cultural dimension of critical thinking.
Both the individual and the socio-cultural dimensions can be given a place,
and reconciled, in a single model of critical thinking in higher education. I see
both dimensions as separate and distinguishable axes or vectors that account for
very different, equally important, aspects of critical thinking. To date, much of
the scholarly effort has been (rightly) expended on the individual axis, with its
emphasis on the cultivation of skills and dispositions. This is understandable: being
an (individual) critical thinker naturally has many personal and social benefits, not to
mention its need in the workplace. Increasingly, however, more work is being done
on the socio-cultural dimension. This too is important, albeit it is often neglected.
I begin by looking at the various, well-known definitions of the concept of critical
thinking, and put these into a conceptual framework. Following this, I shall outline
various views of critical thinking incorporating skills, judgments, dispositions,
actions and social relations. In Part 2, I provide a model—a model of critical
thinking in higher education—that incorporates all these dimensions.
What Is Critical Thinking?
The first thing to do is to gain an understanding of critical thinking as it applies in
higher education. One way of doing this would be to take the strategy of isolating
negative instances of critical thinking, i.e., to say what critical thinking is not. This
helps to delimit the boundaries of the concept. Fortunately, there is little dispute on
negative cases. Critical thinking is not:
• Purposeless thinking: Day-dreaming, musing and idle thinking is not critical
thinking, ‘they do not qualify for the adjective “critical”’ (McPeck, 1981, p. 3).
Instead, it is agreed that critical thinking must be goal-directed, aimed towards
an end, and purposeful.
• Random thinking: Careless, misdirected and sloppy thinking is not critical think-
ing either. Using questionable evidence, failure to assess sources, and relying
on dubious authority is contrary to critical thinking (Bailin, Case, Coombs, &
Daniels, 1999). Critical thinking relies on meeting adequate standards.
• Accidental or unintentional thinking: Arriving inadvertently or unintentionally at
the correct critical assessment of a position or the accomplishment of a goal is
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insufficient for critical thinking. Critical thinking must be done in full knowledge
and awareness of the standards of thinking expected (even if these “standards”
cannot necessarily be verbalized) (Bailin et al., 1999, p. 287). To put it in
other terms, critical thinking is necessarily an ‘intellectually disciplined process’
(Scriven & Paul, 1987). Mindless application of a set of logical principles “as an
exercise” will not suffice. There must be some kind of metacognitive awareness
as well (Mulnix, 2012, p. 465).
• Good thinking: Critical thinking can be exemplified in “good” thinking, but
the relationship is asymmetrical: not all good thinking is an example of critical
thinking. The concepts are not equivalent.
• Independent thinking: This can be seen in the same way as “good” thinking:
the relationship is asymmetrical. One can think independently without thinking
critically.
• Rational thinking: These are closely connected but not identical, and critical
thinking is a facet of what it means to be “rational” (McPeck, 1981, p. 12).
• Problem-solving: While sometimes used interchangeably, critical thinking and
problem-solving are not equivalent either. Not all critical thinking we do
necessarily involves solving problems. The key here is that problem-solving
involves making judgments in order to complete tasks. These judgments can
either meet or fail to meet standards of critical thinking, so in solving a problem
we may engage, or fail to engage, in critical thinking.
• Decision-making: This can be seen in the same way as “problem-solving”:
‘Problem solving decision making, etc., are best seen as arenas in which critical
thinking should take place rather than other kinds of thinking to be contrasted
with critical thinking’ (Bailin et al., 1999, p. 288 italics mine).
• Higher-order thinking: This is a vague, umbrella term referring to ‘critical,
logical, reflective, metacognitive, and creative thinking’ (King, Goodson, &
Rohani, n.d.). As a term with a wider ambit, it is not, by definition, identical
to critical thinking which is narrower in scope.
• Logical, reflective, metacognitive thinking: These are aspects or elements of
critical thinking as we shall see, but on their own not equivalent to critical
thinking which has a broader ambit (see below).
• Creative thinking: A number of things can be the product of creative thinking:
dances, dramatic work, poetry, scientific innovation, and so on. The differences
are best summarized as follows: ‘creativity masters a process of making or
producing; criticality, a process of assessing or judging’ (Paul & Elder, 2008,
p. 4). Creative thinking and critical thinking are (sometimes) inseparable kinds
of thinking, but they not exactly the same. I shall return to creative thinking in
Part 2.
• ‘Intuitive’ thinking: This is an ambiguous term. It can be considered in some
sense as a form of creative thinking (if used synonymously), or random thinking
(if used to mean “without reasons”). Neither are the same as critical thinking
for reasons already provided. Interestingly, however, “intuitive” might also mean
“beyond” reasons, or trans-critical, as in the case (say) of an accomplished
sportsperson’s placement of a ball or understanding of game strategy, or a
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mother’s “intuition” that her child is unwell. This kind of “intuition” is often
right, grounded in background knowledge, common lore, is evidence-based,
rational (albeit not always consciously so), and so forth, and yet which does not
seem synonymous with critical thinking, though an important part of it. (I shall
return to this kind of thinking in Part 2.)
The second, more difficult, step to take would be to define critical thinking. This
is not easy. Some years ago, one scholar remarked that: ‘After reading the various
definitions of critical thinking, it becomes clear that agreement upon a single,
concise definition of this concept is difficult, if not impossible’ (Skinner, 1976,
p. 293). This led one theorist to claim that critical thinking was both “over-worked”
and “under-analyzed” (McPeck, 1981, p. 2), and another to call the situation like
being mired in a ‘conceptual swamp’ (Cuban, 1984, p. 686). However, the task of
defining critical thinking has been attempted and the more well-known definitions
of critical thinking proposed over the past few decades have included the following
(in chronological order):
• ‘ : : : correct assessing of statements’ (Ennis, 1962, p. 8)
• ‘ : : : the propensity and skill to engage in an activity to reflective skepticism’
(McPeck, 1981, p. 8) : : : ‘the intelligent use of all available evidence for the
solution of some problem’ (McPeck, p. 12)
• ‘ : : : reflective and reasonable thinking that is focused on deciding what to
believe or do’ (Ennis, 1985b, p. 45).
• ‘ : : : the ability to analyze facts, generate and organize ideas, defend opinions,
make comparisons, draw inferences, evaluate arguments and solve problems’
(Chance, 1986, p. 6).
• ‘ : : : to detect and avoid fallacious reasoning and to analyze deductive and
inductive arguments’ (Kurfiss, 1988, p. iii).
• ‘active, systematic process of understanding and evaluating arguments’ (Mayer
& Goodchild, 1990, p. 4)
• ‘ : : : careful and deliberate determination of whether to accept, reject, or suspend
judgment’ (Moore & Parker, 1991, p. 4).
• ‘ : : : Thinking about your thinking while you’re thinking to make your thinking
better’ (Paul, 1993, p. 91).
• ‘ : : : thinking aimed at forming a judgment’ where the thinking itself meets
standards of adequacy and accuracy (Bailin et al., 1999, p. 287), or ‘fulfilling
relevant standards of critical assessment in carrying out thinking tasks’ (p. 291).
(For other definitions, see Fisher & Scriven, 1997; Halpern, 1997, p. 4; Lipman,
1988, p. 39; Scriven & Paul, 1987; Siegel, 1988, p. 25; Tama, 1989, p. 64).
Over the years, the plethora of definitions and distinctions expounded on the topic
of critical thinking were thought to be a hindrance to clarity. This applied especially
to the myriad of definitions developed during the first and second “waves” of the
critical thinking movement in the 1970s and 1980s (Paul, 2011). Something clearly
had to be done.
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The American Philosophical Association convened an authoritative panel of 46
noted experts on the subject, to produce a definitive account of the concept. It
resulted in the production of the landmark Delphi Report (Facione, 1990). This led
to the following definition of critical thinking; a definition which is as long and
comprehensive as it is dense and hard to follow:
We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results
in interpretation, analysis, evaluation and inference as well as explanation of the evidential
conceptual, methodological, criteriological or contextual considerations upon which that
judgment was based. Critical thinking is essential as a tool of inquiry. Critical thinking is
pervasive and self-rectifying, human phenomenon. The ideal critical thinker is habitually
inquisitive, well-informed, honest in facing personal biases, prudent in making judgments,
willing to consider, clear about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking
relevant information, reasonable in selection of criteria, focused in inquiry and persistent
in seeking result which are as precise as the subject and circumstances of inquiry permit.
(Facione, 1990)
While of undeniable importance as a definition of critical thinking for educational
philosophers, this account of critical thinking does not lend itself easily to edu-
cational decision-making. How would a Dean of a Faculty, for example, use this
definition to further embed the teaching of critical thinking in the curriculum? How
useful is it, in a practical sense, in a higher education context? It is not clear that
higher education can benefit from such a definition in the form it is presented. Nor
does it square with the wider concerns of higher education academics about the
nature of criticality. It seems, on the face of it, a definition rooted in one kind of
critical thinking (albeit an important one); namely, critical thinking as argumentation
and judgment formation.
Of course, all definitions are limiting in some respects, and one definition will
never satisfy everyone. It is not easy, it seems, to define critical thinking in a way
which is both comprehensive and practically useful. As Facione (the Delphi report
author) himself has wryly observed, defining “critical thinking” is something like
trying to define “offensive violence”. We may “know it when we see it”, and be able
to distinguish it from its opposite—i.e., illogical, irrational thinking—but refining
our ideas further than this does not allow us to easily form a clear, and unambiguous
definition that would be immediately helpful in a range of contexts (Facione, 1998)
(See also Bailin et al., 1999, p. 285; McPeck, 1981, p. 1).
Others have claimed, however, that without clarifying the concept of critical
thinking, educators risk ‘shooting arrows at target we cannot see’ (Mulnix, 2012,
p. 464), so a definition of some kind—even if it is limiting—is better than none
at all. All concur the task is difficult. (Mulnix herself takes the tack of defining
critical thinking in its simplest, unadorned form as: ‘acquiring, developing, and
exercising the skill of being able to grasp inferential connections holding between
statements’ (Mulnix, pp. 464–465). This effectively reduces critical thinking merely
to skills in logical reasoning—“logicality”—and nothing more. For reasons outlined
earlier, this will not do as a definition for the purposes of critical thinking in Higher
Education.)
The miasma of definitions of critical thinking cannot on their own guide the way
to greater clarity. Some analysis and deconstruction of the definitions given above
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is therefore in order. I shall take the Delphi definition as the authoritative account.
From this, I shall explore what it might mean if critical thinking is taken beyond
customary definitions to include wider considerations, and what it might mean if
all such considerations could be encompassed in an overarching model of critical
thinking (see Part 2).
Among the various threads in the above definition, we can distinguish the
following: critical thinking as skills in inference-making and argumentation; critical
thinking as (reflective) judgment formation, and critical thinking as a variety of
dispositions and attitudes. These can be broadly defined into two broad categories:
cognitive elements (argumentation, inference-making and reflective judgment) and
propensity elements (dispositions, abilities and attitudes) (Halonen, 1995). Note,
however, the phenomenon of action is not mentioned in the Delphi definition. It is,
in principle possible to meet the stipulated requirements of the definition and not
do anything, i.e., not engage in critical activity of a physical kind. This will become
important later. For now, let us look in more detail at each of the elements of the
Delphi definition under the headings: namely, cognitive elements and propensity
elements.
Cognitive Elements to Critical Thinking
The following account of the cognitive and propensity elements to critical thinking
constitutes the approach of looking at critical thinking through what we might
call a “philosophical” lens. In Part 2, I turn to a very different way of looking at
critical thinking; namely, critical thinking through a “higher education” lens. They
are very different approaches, although complementary, as we shall see. Later I shall
propose a framework for the various positions in the critical thinking literature that
encompasses both philosophical and higher education considerations on the topic.
These positions will lie along certain axes or vectors on my model. The model will
hopefully contextualize, and make clear, some of the very diverse work currently
being undertaken under the auspices of “critical thinking in higher education”.
Critical Thinking as Argumentation (The “Skills” View)
Critical thinking as argumentation is an essential skill for the reflective citizen as
well as the student. Although, as discussed, there are varying definitions of “critical
thinking” (Ennis, 1985a, 1990; Lipman, 1988; McPeck, 1981; Paul, 1992b), and
considerable discussion over those definitions, for most purposes critical thinking
can be defined—in part at least—as a skill, which can be learned, involving the intel-
lectual activity of identifying, analyzing and evaluating arguments and propositions.
I shall call this the “skills”-based view, or critical thinking as “logicality” (Burbules
& Berk, 1999). Ennis, at one point, defines critical thinking as ‘correct assessing of
statements’ (Ennis, 1962, p. 8), later changing his definition to incorporate reflective
judgment formation (see below, “Critical thinking as reflective thinking”).
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Identifying, analyzing and evaluating arguments and propositions is, of course,
a fundamental skill that is increasingly expected of students by educators and
employers in the “knowledge” economy and is thus of economic and social
importance. A major theme of the recent text Academically Adrift, and the one that
has received the most US media attention, is that higher education has not done
enough for the improvement of students’ critical thinking in the sense given above
(Arum & Roska, 2011). Today’s students, it seems, are not as well prepared as they
might be in their capacity to isolate, discuss, analyze and evaluate arguments. But
why is this so important?
Argumentation and Decision-Making
Critical thinking as argumentation is ubiquitous in all professional and academic
areas, but is particularly important in higher education. Higher education prepares
people for employment, and instills in individuals the capacity to make reasoned
arguments of all kinds throughout our lives—both as a human being in a social or
academic context, and later, as a member of a corporate or professional community
as an employee.
As individuals, of course, we often face complex issues about which we must
weigh evidence and come to conclusions. Eventually we might make decisions
based on those conclusions. These need not be decisions about academic issues,
of course, but may be fairly domestic and mundane, e.g., whether or not to send a
child to a private or public school, whether or not to invest in property or shares,
or whether to subscribe to a given social, political or sporting organization. In
each case, as individuals we have to weigh competing arguments—i.e., propositions
in support of a given contention, and/or objections to them—and arrive at well-
reasoned decisions about the truth or falsity, or the likely plausibility of a conclusion.
Critical thinking as argumentation also involves distinguishing validity of argument
structure from the believability or soundness of premises, distinguishing fallacious
reasoning from valid reasoning, and so on.
Corporations, similarly, also have to make decisions on the basis of strong and
compelling arguments, e.g., whether, and on what terms, to make appointments or
large purchasing decisions. Likewise, legal practitioners, compelled by arguments
for or against a proposition, and underpinned by the weight of evidence, are often
required to make judgments that affect the lives of others in a very dramatic way—
for example, whether or not to make a plea bargain in a criminal trial, or how, and
under which circumstances, to advise a client when asked to articulate their guilt
or innocence in a court of law. Medical doctors face similar difficult decisions,
for example, deciding upon a course of treatment that may slow the progress of
a disease yet potentially decrease the quality of a person’s life. Governments also
make important choices; for example, in relation to acquisition of expensive military
equipment; or when making difficult, yet influential, decisions in the areas of public
or foreign policy. These issues involve many arguments on both sides of difficult
debates. Skills in argumentation are clearly essential in all areas of life.
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Strong skills in argumentation lead naturally to a sound basis for capable
decision-making. This is because decision-making is based on judgments derived
from argumentation. (As noted earlier, decision-making is best seen as ‘an arena
in which critical thinking takes place’ i.e., as a forum for critical thinking, but
not as critical thinking itself.) Such decision-making involves understanding and
interpreting the propositions and arguments of others, and being able to make
objections and provide rebuttals to objections. Broadly speaking, then, this sense
of the term “critical thinking” is seen as involving skills in formal or informal
argumentation. Critical thinking in this sense is a fundamental skill; a skill which—
on the available evidence—universities have apparently not been teaching as well
as they should.
The first and most basic form of cognitive critical thinking then is skills in
argumentation. The aforementioned definition of critical thinking provided by
Mulnix is most suited to this kind of skill. It is unadorned critical thinking as it
were. It is critical thinking in its purest form.
Critical Thinking as Reflective Thinking
(The “Skills-and-Judgments” View)
Critical thinking is often defined more generally than this, however, and in practical
and instrumental terms, e.g., as: ‘reflective and reasonable thinking that is focused
on deciding what to believe or do’ (Ennis, 1985b) or as ‘thinking aimed at forming
a judgment’ (Bailin et al., 1999, p. 287) or as ‘skillful, responsible thinking that
facilitates good judgment’ (Lipman, 1988, p. 39). This definition focuses less on
the mechanics of the skill of argumentation, and more on the reflective basis for
decision-making and judgment calls. We might call this the “skills-and-judgments”
view.
These wider senses of critical thinking are not inconsistent with ‘critical thinking
as argumentation’, of course, and are indeed, in some sense premised on it. Being
able to demonstrate “reflective thinking” for the purposes of decision-making,
of course, requires skills in argumentation. However, this account does put a
slightly different emphasis on critical thinking, focusing less on mechanisms of
argumentation qua inference-making, and more on judgment formation which is
at a higher cognitive level. (The relationship seems asymmetric: one can engage in
idle argumentation without making a judgment towards a decision, but not vice-
versa—or at least not ideally.)
This twist in emphasis is not insignificant, however. It marks a distinction
between critical thinking as pure “logicality” (critical thinking as argumentation)
and critical thinking—potentially at least—as involving much more than this. This
observation will important when I come to look at critical thinking through the
“higher education” lens. The relationship between the argumentation view and
the skills-and-judgments view is represented in the diagram below. (Note that the
dotted lines represent permeability. As we have seen, Ennis for one has articulated
definitions in both spheres (Fig. 2.1).
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Fig. 2.1 The critical thinking movement
Both accounts are examples of critical thinking as it applies to individuals. They
are also representative of work done as part of the so-called “critical thinking
movement”. A number of the aforementioned definitions provided earlier can be
seen as amenable to this view of critical thinking as they all mention “skills” and/or
“judgments” (see, for example, Bailin et al., 1999; Ennis, 1985b; Facione, 1998;
Lipman, 1988; McPeck, 1981; Moore & Parker, 1991). Others in the list provided
earlier focus more on skills in argumentation simpliciter (Chance, 1986; Ennis,
1962; Kurfiss, 1988; Mayer & Goodchild, 1990; Mulnix, 2012). Ennis is perhaps
unique in having articulated published definitions of critical thinking encompassing
both accounts (one being a development and an advance on the other).
The definition by Ennis, given above, i.e., ‘reflective and reasonable thinking
that is focused on deciding what to believe or do’ is recognized as the established
definition in the “skills-and-judgments” view. It is widely cited in the literature.
However, note that Ennis’ definition is somewhat limiting by not necessitating, for
its application, any commitment to action on the part of the critical thinker. On
Ennis’ account, a person might exhibit critical thinking defined as ‘reasonable and
reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do’, without requiring that
the decision actually be implemented (i.e., what philosophers, including Aristotle,
call “weakness of the will”) (Ennis, pers. comm. 2012).
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On Ennis’ account ‘“deciding” is assumed to lead relatively unproblematically
to the “doing”’ (Burbules & Berk, 1999; Ennis, 1987). However, the “doing” is
not specified in his account. The same applies to the comprehensive, all-inclusive
account in the Delphi report as we have seen. Clearly, however, critical thinking in
higher education should involve more than judging and deciding; it should involve
some actual or potential commitment to action. Reasonable decision-making by
itself, it seems, is not sufficient for critical thinking—in other words, critical
thinking in higher education is not critical judgment in abstracto. I shall return to
this point (see “Critical thinking as action” below).
The cognitive element of critical thinking can be seen as a composite of the
following related, but quite different, skills and abilities:
• analysing arguments, claims or evidence (Ennis, 1985b; Facione, 1990; Halpern,
1998; Paul, 1992b);
• judging or evaluating arguments (Ennis, 1985b; Facione, 1990; Lipman, 1988;
Tindal & Nolet, 1995);
• making decisions or problem-solving (Ennis, 1985b; Halpern, 1998; Willingham,
2007);
• inference-making using a variety of standard reasoning patterns such as induction
and deduction (Ennis, 1985b; Facione, 1990; Paul, 1992b; Willingham, 2007).
• predicting (Tindal & Nolet, 1995);
• reasoning verbally (Halpern, 1998);
• interpreting and explaining (Facione, 1990);
• identifying assumptions (Ennis, 1985b; Paul, 1992b);
• defining terms (Ennis, 1985b); and
• asking questions for clarification (Ennis, 1985b).
Bloom’s famous six-category schema of knowledge, comprehension, applica-
tion, analysis, synthesis and evaluation, can be seen in terms of a forerunner of
a cognitive approach to critical thinking, with critical thinking as argumentation
occupying the latter three descriptors, where “evaluation” gives rise to making
reasonable, reflective judgments (Bloom, 1956; Kennedy, Fisher, & Ennis, 1991).
To this list we can add metacognition as a facet of critical thinking as cognitive
skill. Although not a feature of argumentation per se, it is clearly necessary for it.
People need to be ‘brave enough to risk being wrong, and wise enough to realize that
much can be learned from errors and failed solutions’ (Nelson, 2005, p. xiv), and
this involves thinking about our thinking. This can be defined as ‘awareness of one’s
own thinking, awareness of the content of one’s conceptions, an active monitoring
of one’s cognitive processes’ (Hennessey, 1999, p. 3) or as ‘the monitoring and
control of thought’ (Martinez, 2006, p. 696). Though there is some dispute as to the
precise role played by metacognition in relation to critical thinking (some argue
that it stands outside of critical thinking; others argue it is integral to it), there
is little doubt that it is important for any adequate understanding of the concept
(Halonen, 1995; Halpern, 1998; Kuhn, 1999; Kuhn & Dean, 2004; van Gelder, 2005;
Willingham, 2007). A recent attempt has been made to devise a comprehensive
taxonomy of metacognition (Tarricone, 2011).
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To sum up the “skills and judgments” view in general terms, we can think of
cognitive critical thinking skills as involving interpretation, analysis, inference,
explanation, evaluation, and some element of metacognition or self-regulation
(Facione, Sanchez, Facione, & Gainen, 1995, p. 3; Halonen, 1995, pp. 92–93).
These facets of critical thinking are all in the Delphi list. This is sometimes
collectively known as the “skills-based” view of critical thinking—as distinct from
the “skills-plus-dispositions” view, which I will discuss shortly. While the “skills
and judgments” view involves more than skills in argumentation (it also involves
reasoned judgments as we have seen) it is sometimes known simply as the “skills-
based” view in recognition of the fact that both skills and reflective judgments
are both cognitive skills. Cognitive skills in critical thinking are at the core of the
“philosophical” approach to the topic, and necessary—but not sufficient—to other
accounts of critical thinking as well as we shall see.
An attempt has been made by the present author to plot the various skills
proffered by various authors on the topic of critical thinking—from Bloom’s
taxonomy onwards—into a table and to cross-tabulate the results. This table is
available online here [add].
A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Skills
At this point categorizing these skills would seem to be useful. I shall use the
framework by Wales and Nardi (1984), and borrowed by Halonen (1995), for
this purpose. Cognitive critical thinking skills can be seen as falling under four
main categories: lower-level thinking skills (which might be called “foundation”
thinking), thinking skills (or “higher level” thinking), complex thinking skills, and
thinking about thinking or metacognitive skills. “Identifying an assumption” for
example, is clearly less difficult—and requires fewer cognitive resources—than say
“analysing a claim” or “drawing an inference”. There might be debate about which
skill belongs in which category, but there is little doubt some cognitive skills are
demonstrably more sophisticated than others (Table 2.1).
There is considerable degree of unanimity in the literature on many the cognitive
skills involved in critical thinking, if not the degree of importance accorded to each.
In any event, the view that: (1) critical thinking is argumentation, and involves
assessing statements, constructing and interpreting inferences, identifying flaws in
Table 2.1 Critical thinking skills
Lower-level thinking
skills (“Foundation”)
Higher-level
thinking skills
Complex
thinking skills
Thinking about
thinking
Interpreting Analyzing claims Evaluating arguments Metacognition
Identifying
assumptions
Synthesizing claims Reasoning verbally Self-regulation
Asking questions for
clarification
Predicting Inference making
Problem solving
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reasoning, and so on; and (2) critical thinking is judgment formation, is a pervasive
and important one. However as we shall see, despite its importance, when applied to
the higher education context (as opposed to a philosophical context) critical thinking
is defined far too narrowly.
Propensity Elements to Critical Thinking
A very different, but no less important, way to think of critical thinking is not just in
terms of cognitive elements such as argumentation and reflective thinking, but also
in terms of propensity (i.e., an inclination or tendency to behave in a certain way).
I shall look at propensity elements in this section.
Critical Thinking as Dispositions
(The “Skills-Plus-Dispositions” View)
One such propensity is the notion of a critical thinking disposition (Facione et al.,
1995). It has long been recognized that the ability to think critically is very different
from the attitude or disposition to do so (Ennis, 1985b; Facione, 1990), and this
too needs to be considered in any attempt to define critical thinking. Dispositions
have been described as ‘at least half the battle of good thinking, and arguably more’
(Perkins, Jay, & Tishman, 1992, p. 9).
Dispositions are sometimes defined as a “cast or habit of the mind” or “frame
of mind” which is necessary for exercising critical thinking. Dispositions are not
arguments or judgments, but affective states. They include critical thinking attitudes
and a sense of psychological readiness of the human being to be critical. They are
equivalent to what Passmore once called a ‘critical spirit’ (Passmore, 1967, p. 25),
and have been defined as a constellation of attitudes, intellectual virtues, and habits
of mind (Facione et al., 1995). They are internal motivations to ‘act toward or
respond to persons, events, or circumstances in habitual, yet potentially malleable
ways’ (Facione, 2000, p. 64). While not themselves skills or judgmental abilities,
dispositions to think critically are seen by some to be a precursor to doing any
critical thinking at all.
The notion of a disposition can be traced back to the work of the philosopher
Gilbert Ryle who asserted that possession of a dispositional property was ‘not to be
in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable
to be in a particular state’ (Ryle, 1963). His classic example is glass which has a
disposition to break even if it is not broken into pieces at a given moment. However,
unlike glass, critical thinking is a reflective capacity, and is not automatic. It is
the reflective capacity that qualifies a disposition as being a thinking disposition
(Ennis, 1994; Tishman and Andrade, nd, p. 2). Dispositions, it should be noted,
are different from skills or abilities—though obviously related to them—insofar as
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a person might not be disposed to use their skills or abilities even if they possess
them (a talented pianist might not be disposed to exercise her skill by playing, for
example).
Researchers have identified the following dispositions as most important for
critical thinking:
• respect for alternative viewpoints (Bailin et al., 1999; Facione, 1990);
• inquisitiveness (Bailin et al., 1999; Facione, 1990, 2000);
• open-mindedness (Bailin et al., 1999; Ennis, 1985b; Facione, 1990, 2000;
Halpern, 1998); fair-mindedness (Bailin et al., 1999; Facione, 1990);
• the propensity or willingness to seek or be guided by reason (Bailin et al., 1999;
Ennis, 1985b; Paul, 1992b);
• a desire to be well-informed (Ennis, 1985b; Facione, 1990).
• tentativeness, skepticism, tolerance of ambiguity, and appreciation of individual
differences (Halonen, 1995).
• seeing both sides of an issue (Willingham, 2007). (The latter is not exactly
the same as tolerance of ambiguity; and this, arguably, could have a cognitive
element as well.)
• Paul (1992a) identified a list that includes intellectual humility, intellectual
courage, integrity, empathy, perseverance.
Some theorists, according to Facione, consider holding ethical standards to be an
important critical disposition, on the grounds that ‘a defense attorney using critical
thinking abilities and dispositions to get her guilt client acquitted would not be
a critical thinker’ (Facione, 1990; Halonen, 1995; Lai, 2011, p. 12). This seems
plausible, and most researchers would concur with this assessment.
How Many Dispositions Are There?
The number of dispositions that are stated to exist varies widely. Ennis, for example,
has distinguished between three critical thinking dispositions, and fifteen separate
critical thinking abilities (Ennis, 2011); Perkins, Jay and Tishman, by contrast,
identify five dispositions. Some theorists also identify an overarching thinking
disposition, identified by some as mindfulness (Langer, 1989), fairmindedness (Paul,
1990), critical-spiritedness (Siegel, 1988), or just an overarching disposition to think
critically (Facione & Facione, 1992). By the latter, it is meant that, not only should
a person demonstrate the capacity (the cognitive skills) to seek reasons, truth, and
evidence and so on—but they should also exhibit the drive or tendency to do so
(Ennis, 1987, 1996). This drive or tendency is a critical thinking disposition. For
Ennis, the critical thinking disposition is what animates or gives rise to the critical
thinking skills discussed earlier.
Some scholars have gone to a great deal of trouble to provide extensive
compendia of such dispositions (Facione & Facione, 1992). But the role these
dispositions play in relation to the cognitive skills of critical thinking remain in
dispute. Some scholars, for example, have argued that a critical thinking disposition
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is not what animates or gives rise to the cognitive skills of critical thinking (as Ennis
claims), but more a deep-seated character attribute. Siegel, for example, argues that
Ennis fails to distinguish between the critical thinker as a person and their way of
living from the critical thinking skills he or she exhibits. The former, according to
Siegel (echoing Passmore) is a matter of “critical spirit” (Siegel, 1988).
Similarly, Paul distinguishes between critical thinking in the “weak” sense, and
critical thinking in the “strong” sense (Paul, 1993). The former consists of the
skills and dispositions already discussed; the latter consists of the examined life
in which skills and dispositions have been incorporated as part of one’s deep-
seated personality and moral sense—in short, one’s character. This distinction shall
become important for us later as it highlights the importance of the relationship
of critical thinking to personality, consciousness and one’s moral sense, i.e., one’s
actions and behaviours in terms of relating to others. This, in turn, is less a function
of, I have called, the individual dimension of critical thinking, and more a function
of the socio-cultural dimension. In terms I shall refer to later, this is, I feel, an
axis dispute about critical thinking, not a dispute about substance, i.e., it is a matter
of where, on my model of critical thinking, one locates one’s interest in critical
thinking (and on which axis).
For now, it is probably less important to provide an authoritative list of disposi-
tions, and to form an opinion on the role of dispositions in relation to skills, but to
merely acknowledge that scholarly work is ongoing in this area and dispositions are
an essential part of critical thinking research.
A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Dispositions
To sum up this section: critical thinking dispositions might be broadly categorized
as falling under (1) dispositions arising in relation to the self, (2) dispositions arising
in relation to others, and (3) dispositions arising in relation to the world. Again, it
might be debated which category a disposition belongs to (and some might belong
to more than one) but it is fairly clear that there are at least three dispositional
orientations (Table 2.2).
There are other ways of categorizing the dispositions. Another way of creating
a taxonomy of dispositions is to divide them, as does Facione (and the authors of
the Delphi report), into two categories: approaches to life and living in general,
approaches to specific issues/questions or problems (Facione, 1990, p. 13). Unlike
Facione, however, I suggest a forth category, that can be added to the schema given
above, namely, “other”, for dispositions that do not easily fit into one or other of the
earlier categories (for example, “mindfulness”, “critical spiritedness”, etc.).
Again, like the critical thinking skills and abilities, an attempt has been made by
the present author to plot the various dispositions proffered by various authors over
the years on the topic of critical thinking—from Dewey’s work onwards—into a
table and to cross-tabulate the results. This table is available from the present author
upon request.
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Table 2.2 Critical thinking dispositions
Dispositions arising
in relation to self
Dispositions arising
in relation to others
Dispositions arising
in relation to world Other
Desire to be
well-informed
Respect for
alternative viewpoints
Interest Mindfulness
Inquisitiveness Critical spiritedness
Willingness to seek or
be guided by reason
Open-mindedness Seeing both sides of
an issue
Tentativeness Fair-mindedness
Tolerance of ambiguity Appreciation of
individual differences
Intellectual humility Skepticism
Intellectual courage
Integrity
Empathy
Perseverance
Holding ethical
standards
A preliminary network analysis of dispositions is provided below (Fig. 2.2).
The larger circles indicate the number of dispositions noted, and the cross-linkages
indicate the level of agreement between authors. On this analysis, considerable
agreement exists in the dispositions suggested by Ennis, the authors of the Delphi
Report, and the work of Halpern, Bailin and Facione. A number of “outlier”
dispositions exist as isolated nodes (e.g., by Halonen, Siegel, Jay and Tishman,
Noddings, and others), which seem to have no corresponding agreement with
other authors. An account of dispositions along these lines helps to establish, by
general agreement, which dispositions are more important by means of democratic
consensus. However, it does not establish that “outlier” dispositions are wrong or
ill-conceived.
Unlike the list of cognitive elements to critical thinking discussed earlier, there
is a great deal of diversity of opinion as to what constitutes critical thinking
dispositions and how they should be configured.
What Is the Relationship Between Dispositions?
Advancing what they call, a “triadic account” of critical thinking dispositions,
Perkins, Jay and Tishman identify the following dispositions: the disposition to be
being broad and adventurous; the disposition toward wondering, problem-finding
and investigating; the disposition to build explanations and understandings; the dis-
position to make plans and be strategic; the disposition to be intellectually careful;
the disposition to seek and evaluate reasons; the disposition to be metacognitive
(thereby identifying metacognition as not a thinking skill, per se, but a disposition
to be so inclined). They also identify three components or elements to a disposition:
sensitivity (a perception of appropriateness); inclination (the felt impetus toward
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Fig. 2.2 Network analysis of dispositions [NB: This is a work-in-progress by the present author]
a behaviour), and ability (a basic capacity to follow-through with a behaviour)
(Perkins et al., 1992). Some empirical studies have attempted to isolate which are
most important, and there is ongoing research into this area (Facione et al., 1995;
Ip et al., 2000).
The general point here, however, is this: there is clearly a difference between
demonstrating cognitive skills in critical thinking (qua argumentation and judg-
ments), and being critically disposed toward someone or something. In keeping
with the analogy mentioned earlier, a lawyer might demonstrate impressive skills
in argumentation and reflective thinking (judgments). For example, he or she could
marshal clever arguments in order to acquit his or her client. Yet they might not
be critically disposed towards their client, nor necessarily see his or her case as
something that is important, interesting or worthwhile. Again, such a case would
scarcely be a model of critical thinking.
Without critical thinking dispositions, it seems, any adequate understanding of
critical thinking is not complete. And yet, broadening critical thinking beyond the
confines of critical thinking-as-argumentation (critical thinking as “logicality”) to
include dispositions—i.e., moving from a “skills-based” view to a “skills-plus-
dispositions”-based view—also holds the prospect for extending the notion of
critical thinking even further. This is what I shall do in Part 2.
Critical Thinking as a Composite of Skills and Attitudes
Critical thinking has naturally been seen in terms of a composite of skills, knowl-
edge and attitudes too—including argumentational, reflective and affective features
(Boostrum, 1994; Brookfield, 1987; Facione, 1990; Kurfiss, 1988; McPeck, 1981;
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Paul, 1981; Siegel, 1988, 1991; Watson & Glaser, 2008). Most theorists hold a
composite account. The composite view includes both the cognitive and propensity
elements discussed above. While the ability to argue and make inferences, to reflect
and make judgments, and be critically disposed is all important, it is also crucial to
recognize that each of these do not occur in isolation. In the case of McPeck, critical
thinking involves a disposition and a skill, and ‘one must develop the disposition to
use those skills’ (McPeck, 1981, p. 3), hence, his definition of critical thinking as ‘a
propensity [disposition] and skill to engage in an activity with reflective skepticism’
(McPeck, p. 8). Similarly, Kurfiss claims that argumentation is the ‘vehicle by which
justification [of beliefs] is offered’ (Kurfiss, 1988, p. 13).
How the cognitive and propensity elements relate to each other in any definition
of critical thinking is subject to much discussion. Facione, et al., for example,
postulate an interactionist hypothesis where ‘the disposition toward critical thinking
reinforces critical thinking skills and that success with critical thinking skills
reinforces the disposition’ (Facione et al., 1995, p. 17). They also claim that
cognitive skills and dispositions are “mutually reinforced” and should be explicitly
taught and modeled together (Facione et al., p. 4). These are complex issues, the
details of which will not concern us here.
Critical Thinking as Emotions
Another propensity element that is sometimes overlooked in discussions about
critical thinking is the emotions. Brookfield has noted that critical thinking is as
much an emotional concept, as a cognitive one (Brookfield, 1987). Emotions are a
part of our propensity toward critical thinking. He argued that both positive and
negative emotions can lead to critical thinking; such as, for example, when an
element of surprise leads to a state of disequilibrium, and thence to critical thinking
that tends toward overcoming the state of uncertainty. This is as important to critical
thinking as the cognitive and affective elements identified by others. According to
Brookfield, ‘joy, release, relief, and exhilaration’ allows critical thinkers to ‘break
through to new ways of looking at our : : : world’ (Brookfield, p. 7). The importance
of emotions to critical thinking has been noted by others (Halonen, 1986). I include
several dispositions in our earlier table which might be thought of as emotion-based
dispositions.
Critical Thinking as Action
In a wider sense, of course, adopting a stance of critical action is also very
important. It is not enough, for example, to be critically disposed and to have a
reasonable and rational inclination “to believe or do” something, it is also important
to act accordingly. This too is part of what we mean by “critical thinking”. Being
actively critical of government actions and political decision-making is a clear
example of this. This might include—to take a topical example—attitudinal or
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physical rebellion against the use of tax-payers money to subsidize errant corporate
greed (e.g., the under-writing of the US banking system following the recent
economic crisis), or actions in relation to topical issues such as globalization
(witness the recent anti-government protests around the world) or protests at
government inaction in relation to the challenge of climate change. To take a recent
example, it could consist of the protests against military coups (e.g., in Egypt). How
can this latter sense of critical thinking be distinguished and reconciled with the
cognitive and propensity elements of critical thinking given earlier?
Definitions of critical thinking as they are applied in the discipline of philosophy,
or the philosophy of education, and as they are applied in higher education, seem
to diverge at this point. However, they remain consistent in any comprehensive
interpretation of “critical thinking” as we shall see (see “A model of critical thinking
in higher education”).
To conclude this section: As it has been traditionally defined, by Ennis, Paul,
McPeck, Lipman, and others in the critical thinking movement, critical thinking has
been seen largely in terms of cognitive elements, e.g., as ‘reflective and reasonable
thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do’. However, this definition
is remiss by not including in its scope any sense of actual or potential action. And,
as noted earlier, higher education is, amongst other things, a defining feature of
how we live our later lives as agents of change. Higher education provides us,
as students, a basis upon which we not only make judgments, and construct and
evaluate arguments, but also a basis upon which we live in the world as practical
beings (not merely “reflecting” beings). Higher education forces us to confront
the world. It educates us into participating in the world as an engaged citizen.
While philosophers of education have their own justifiable reasons for narrowing
the scope of critical thinking to cognitive and affective factors—and this narrowing
has important advantages in terms of shedding light on the nature of critical
thinking—it is essential that critical thinking is defined more broadly for a higher
education context. This definition—for a higher education context (as opposed to
a philosophical context)—would include what is sometimes called “criticality”,
“critical citizenship” and “critical pedagogy” (see Part 2).
A Framework of Critical Thinking Skills and Propensities
Before turning to this, however, I should place the various features of critical think-
ing thus far described into a conceptual framework. Fortunately, others have already
done this work. The following diagram has been adapted from Halonen (1995),
and isolates the two main elements of critical thinking—i.e., both cognitive and
propensity elements—along with the previously outlined features of metacognition,
emotions, a selection of various cognitive attitudes or dispositions, and a state of
personal physiological readiness (Fig. 2.3).
On this model, the latter (physiological readiness of the person, their critical
dispositions and attitudes, and their emotions) all modulate and have the capacity
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Propensity elements
Metacognition
The capacity to monitor the quality of critical thinking
process, product, and changes in the thinker through 
developmental self-assessment.
Emotions
Attitudes/dispositions
[The range of dispositions discussed earlier] e.g., 
Tentativeness, scepticism, Tolerance of ambiguity, 
appreciation of individual differences, high regard 
for ethical practices
Physiological readiness
Foundation skills
Describing behavior
Recognizing
concepts, theories
Interpreting behavior
Indentifying 
assumptions
Listening
Higher Level skills
Applying concepts, theories
Comparing
Contrasting
Analyzing
Predicting
Evaluating theories, 
behavioural claims
Questioning
Synthesizing
Generating hypotheses
Challenging
Complex skills
Problem-solving
Theory building
Formal criticism
Decision-making
Collaborating
C
o
g
n
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e 
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Motivates critical thinking
Refines critical thinking 
Fig. 2.3 The cognitive and propensity influences on critical thinking (Adapted from Halonen,
1995)
to motivate and influence cognitive critical thinking skills. As previously discussed,
the role of metacognition is to refine and monitor critical thinking in both cognitive
and affective forms. Halonen helpfully identifies three types of cognitive critical
thinking skills as we have done, i.e., “foundation”, “higher level” and “complex”
in the diagram below. Using the list of Delphi skills and abilities provided earlier,
these are roughly equivalent to interpretation and descriptive skills (“foundation”),
explanation and evaluation skills (“higher level”) and analysis and inference
(“complex”) skills respectively. Again, the tripartite distinction in skill level is
indicative that some cognitive capacities are more complex—and require more
skill—than others.
In the online tables referred to earlier, I provide an extensive list of (a) the skills of
critical thinking and (b) the critical thinking dispositions as noted by several authors
in the field. The diagram above sums all of these in one framework (Fig. 2.3).
Dimensions of Criticality: An Axis Diagram
Another way of representing these concerns in a more general way is by using an
axis diagram. I begin to build the components of this diagram below, and will add to
the diagram in Part 2. The first stage of the diagram indicates the general concerns
of the critical thinking movement just outlined (the shaded block) occurring along
what might be called an individual “axis of criticality” (the “Y” axis). The term
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“criticality” is used here deliberately as a neutral word, unlike historical loaded
uses of the phrase “critical thinking”. The latter has become accreted with various
meanings over time, and has become hard to define as a result. “Criticality”, happily,
implies no particular account of critical thinking or theoretical emphasis. As we
shall see in the next section, this word is becoming currency among higher education
academics, and others. As we also shall see later—when I come to expand on this
axis diagram—this axis will be important, as other dimensions of criticality have a
quite different focus and lie on a different axes. But I submit that all, in their own
way, inform our understanding of critical thinking in higher education.
The diagram below represents the critical thinking movement which I have
just outlined in some detail (Fig. 2.4). This movement is largely concerned with
individual qualities, i.e., cognitive elements or “inner” skills (argumentational skills,
skills in thinking) and propensity or character attributes of the person (dispositions
and abilities). These are inclusive of all the skills and attributes mentioned in
the diagram provided above (i.e., foundation, higher-level, complex, metacognitive
skills, as well as the much discussed critical thinking abilities and dispositions).
These skills and dispositions are represented by separate lines radiating out from
the bottom of the Y axis. This account of criticality is what we might call “critical
thinking proper” or critical thinking in its traditional senses. This represents the
concerns of the critical thinking movement. The “X” axis, the ‘socio-cultural axis
of criticality’, will be expanded on in Part 2 of the paper.
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The Critical Thinking Movement
Critical Rationality
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SOCIO-CULTURAL AXIS OF CRITICALITY (“Outer” focus)
Fig. 2.4 Axis diagram: the critical thinking movement
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Conclusion
Part 1 of this paper outlined the philosophical account of critical thinking in some
detail, including the critical thinking movement and its emphasis on critical thinking
as skills, judgments and dispositions. An inclusive framework for cognitive and
propensity elements of critical thinking was provided. It was suggested that these
aspects of critical thinking can be seen as dimensions of criticality. Moreover, they
can be considered as “axes” in an overarching model of critical thinking in higher
education. In Part 2, I develop the model further by turning to critical thinking as it is
discussed, not amongst philosophers, but amongst educators; in particular, educators
and professionals in Higher Education.
Part 2: The Socio-cultural Axis
Ron Barnett has defined critical thinking in terms of taking a “critical stance”.
He claims: ‘Critical persons are more than just critical thinkers. They are able to
engage with the world and with themselves as with knowledge’ (Barnett, 1997, p. 1).
Elsewhere, he refers to a critical stance as a disposition, as ‘the ability to size up the
world in its different manifestations and the capacity to respond in different ways.
: : : a willingness to evaluate the world, howsoever it appears. A disposition, after
all, is deep-seated. It suggests that we are in the presence of a person of a certain
kind. The critical spirit, therefore, involves persons fully; it involves and takes over
their being’ (Barnett, p. 87).
This might seem, on the surface, to be vague and unhelpful as a wider definition
of critical thinking, and seems to conflate skills and dispositions (see Part 1).
However, the definition requires some unpacking in the context not of “critical
thinking” per se, but of “criticality”. This leads us to yet another account of
critical thinking to those previously discussed; one which broadens the notion of
critical thinking even further from both the “skills-based” view and the “skills-plus-
dispositions” view. This is the “skills-plus-dispositions-plus-actions” view.
This part of the paper will outline this and two other accounts of critical thinking
in Higher Education before articulating a formal model of critical thinking in higher
education.
Critical Thinking as “Criticality”
(The “Skills-Plus-Dispositions-Plus-Actions” View)
The interpretation of “critical thinking” used amongst higher education scholars
is sometimes expressed in terms of the term criticality. “Criticality” is a term of
fairly recent origin; a word deliberately distinct from the traditional expression
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“critical thinking”, which—after half a century of debate and discussion—is now
a loaded and over-used. The term “criticality”, by contrast, attempts to provide
an ambit perspective of the concept of critical thinking incorporating argument,
judgment/reflection and critical action. It also extends beyond the individual to the
individual’s participation in the world, i.e., in the form of responsible citizenship.
This is a concept of critical thinking involving students reflecting on their knowledge
and simultaneously developing powers of critical thinking, critical self-reflection
and critical action—and thereby developing (as a result) critical being (Barnett,
1997, 2004; Johnston, Ford, Mitchell, & Myles, 2011). “Criticality”, not unlike,
“critical thinking” is, in some quarters, gaining its own scholarly industry.
“Criticality”, although not an established definition of critical thinking in use by
the critical thinking community, and rarely used at all by philosophers (although see
Burbules & Berk, 1999; Paul & Elder, 2001) nonetheless constitutes a unique sense
of “critical thinking” increasingly in use and widely discussed in higher education
circles (see, for example, the number of publications arising from “The Criticality
Project”) (The Criticality Project, 2013). It is important therefore that it is explained
clearly.
What Is “Criticality”?
What is “criticality”? Broadly speaking, criticality comprises—and is a composite
of—three things: thinking, reflecting and acting. In emphasizing “action” in addition
to thinking (in the form of argumentation and reflective judgment), “criticality”
might thus be seen, and conceived of in relation to established definitions of critical
thinking as trait: the exercise of which is critical thinking as customarily defined,
say, as ‘reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to be or do’ (Ennis,
1985b, p. 45). That is, while a critical thinker can be disposed to think critically, in
practice this assumes that he or she exhibits a trait to do so, and to act accordingly.
This trait is criticality. “Criticality” requires that one be moved to do something
(Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 52). Ennis himself has acknowledged that this concept is
missing in his well-known definition of critical thinking (Ennis, pers. comm. 2012)
While skills and dispositions are crucial for critical thinking, they are not sufficient
unless action is added. To adapt a famous line from Kant: critical thinking without
skills is empty; criticality without action is blind.
An Example of “Criticality”
The concept of criticality as a trait—as composite of critical thinking, critical
reflection and critical action—has been made concrete by the use of a famous
photograph as a frontispiece of Barnett’s book Higher Education: A Critical
Business (1997). The photograph depicts a student in front of a line of tanks in
Tiananmen Square in 1989. Most people have seen this photograph; indeed, it is
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one of the defining photographs of the latter part of the twentieth century. How does
the photograph demonstrate critical thinking as “criticality”?
Using this photograph, Barnett implies that higher education should be (if not
always in practice) an educational process involving a composite of thinking,
reflecting and action. “Critical thinking”, in the established cognitive sense proposed
by philosophers such as Ennis, Siegel, Lipman, McPeck and others, is an important,
but by itself inadequate, as a way of capturing what higher education can be at
its best. Barnett describes this established sense of critical thinking as ‘thinking
without a critical edge’ (Barnett, 1997, p. 17). Higher education can potentially do
more than teach students how to demonstrate (for example) ‘reasonable reflective
thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do’ i.e., critical thinking as skills
and judgments. It can also prompt students to take action, and to demonstrate a
socio-political stridency against established norms or practices with which they
are confronted. This, it is argued, is more than what is offered by the critical
thinking movement in relation to skills in critical thinking; it is tantamount to the
development of critical beings.
This is most dramatically demonstrated in the photograph of the student protester
in China, who was, against all odds, acting as a critical being. Critical thinking, in
this very broad sense, qua criticality, is an emerging concept in higher education
scholarship. It expresses the yearning that higher education—in its most developed
form at least—functions to educate citizen to “do” something critically as well as
“be” a critical thinker, and not merely to “reflect” or “judge” critically (still less
merely to “argue” critically). In embracing criticality, higher education attempts to
embrace a higher-order sense of “critical thinking”.
This is a sense of “critical thinking” that—while not inconsistent with established
definitions—strives to extend them from the philosophical sphere of cognitive skills
and dispositions, to the sphere of practical application—i.e., critical thinking as a
trait. It extends beyond the individual and his or her cognitive states and dispositions
to the individual’s participation in society as a critically-engaged citizen-in-the-
world. Note that it also includes a moral and ethical dimension to critical thinking.
After all, a critical thinker does more than reason; they also act ethically on the basis
of their reasoned judgments. The Chinese student in front of the tank was doing
something that he thought was morally right. Moreover, it was moral rightness that
was beyond deliberate weighing of pros and cons to arrive at a decision; in fact, his
action was trans-critical. Had the student rationally considered for a moment what
he was about to do, he would almost certainly had not done it. This action could
be considered an instinctive action in response to the perceived “wrongness” of the
situation. I shall return to this towards the end of the paper.
In developing this argument for the criticality dimension, Barnett claims that
critical thinking, critical reflection, and critical action could be thought of as three
interlocking circles in the form of a Venn diagram (see below). It is important,
according to Barnett, that they be regarded as interlocking—but not as entirely
congruent with each other; otherwise, the space for each of them to work (including
“critical thinking” in the cognitive sense) would be lost (Fig. 2.5).
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Fig. 2.5 The intersection
between critical reason,
critical self-reflection and
critical action (Barnett, 1997,
p. 105)
Critical person
Critical reasonCritical self-
reflection
Critical action
“Thinking” critically, “reflecting” critically, and “acting” critically (and being
“critically disposed”) are subtlety different concepts, and require a different empha-
sis; and one can be a “critical thinker” in all of these ways jointly, or in each of these
ways separately. Just as we saw in Part 1 that a lawyer could demonstrate critical
thinking qua argumentation and reflection without having a critical disposition, so
could a lawyer demonstrate cognitive skills in critical thinking and reflecting, and
critical dispositions, without the necessary and appropriate commitment to action.
That is, he or she might be disposed to think critically about their client, but not
be willing to do anything about it. Without action, however, it is not clear that it
would be a wholly satisfactory case of critical thinking. Just as the importance of
skills and dispositions was an important insight of the critical thinking movement,
the centrality of action is the fundamental insight provided by “criticality” theorists.
In Part 1 we saw the importance placed on critical thinking in terms of skills and
dispositions. Now we see the importance of including critical action.
The multi-faceted nature of critical thinking is, I suspect, part of the reason
that the concept of critical thinking is confusing, and hard to define. Perhaps this
is why—in the context of the discipline of Higher Education—critical thinking is
often seen as a “wicked” competency, that ‘cannot be precisely defined, takes on
different shapes in different contexts, and is likely to keep on developing’ (Knight,
2007, p. 1). Another reason is that “critical thinking” is used as a concept in very
different ways, and for different purposes. Indeed, even within the sphere of critical
thinking in higher education, the term is used differently by philosophers and higher
education professionals, as we have seen.
The respective concerns of educational philosophers and higher education schol-
ars in relation to the topic of critical thinking are different, and have a quite different
explanatory purpose. The work of Ennis, Paul, McPeck and others aims to identify
the philosophical elements of what a critical thinker is or should be; the work of
Barnett—and those interested in criticality—aims to identify what a critical thinker
does and can become. In turn, the implications for higher education on producing
critical beings—prepared to act and critique social norms—also holds out a promise
for what higher education can be—which, demonstrably, given the “corporate”
nature of the university, it is not at present (Cowden & Singh, 2013). Together,
as we shall see, these separate and complimentary accounts provide a potentially
insightful view of the nature and concerns of critical thinking in higher education.
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Educating for Criticality
“Criticality” then is a wider concept than “critical thinking”, as it is customarily
defined by educational philosophers. To some extent it subsumes it. One outcome
of this wider concept being taken up, of course, is that it suggests a wider set
of responsibilities on higher education professionals, i.e., teachers and academics,
than that of (simply) imparting skills in argumentation, or developing in students a
capacity for rational “reflection” or decision-making, or cultivating critical thinking
dispositions. Educating for criticality—as opposed to education merely for critical
thinking—holds out a sense that higher education can become (more) a process
of radical development than merely a process of education; it captures a sense of
enabling students to reach a level of what Barnett calls “transformatory critique”
(i.e., to live and breathe as a critical thinker; to become an exemplar of what it
means to be a “critical being”). (see Barnett, 1997, pp. 103–115)
Regardless of the various terminology and definitions used throughout history,
“critical thinking”—however it is defined—is recognized by all as vitally important
in terms of developing the skills necessary for individuals to appropriately under-
stand, reflect on, and engage with important issues. This, it is hoped, leads towards
the ultimate end of developing and enabling effective and responsible citizenship,
i.e., to become an upstanding, engaged, and fully participating, and flourishing
member of society (Ten Dam & Volman, 2004). As noted in our discussion of
the Chinese student, educating for criticality, to produce a critical being, not
merely a critical thinker, also has a moral and ethical dimension. In educating
for critical citizens, we take it for granted that critical citizens will behave justly,
will respond to situations morally, and will act responsibly (albeit critically, in
reaction to perceived wrong-doings). This, criticality theorists argue, is as much a
part of critical thinking—and a consequence of critical thinking—as argumentation,
dispositions and attributes. Indeed, it might be seen as the preeminent role and
function of higher education. I return to critical being later.
The Axis Diagram Revisited
We can now see the place of the “criticality” dimension in our axis diagram and its
relationship to the critical thinking movement. The criticality dimension is repre-
sented below as a shaded block in relation to the concerns of the critical thinking
movement (CTM). For simplicity, I shall call this new dimension “The criticality
movement” (CM). However, this is an attenuated sense of the word “movement”.
The criticality movement, as I am calling it, is less a formal movement—understood
as a wide-spread “call to action”—as a set of concerns held by a number of higher
education academics in reaction to traditional accounts of critical thinking (i.e.,
the CTM). It could be considered part of “third wave” theorizing (Paul, 2011).
Nonetheless, it is helpful to consider it a movement, albeit a movement with a much
smaller, through growing, influence.
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The concerns of the criticality movement arise in reaction to the narrow emphasis
of previous accounts of critical thinking. These previous accounts view critical
thinking in terms of individual skills, dispositions and abilities. While proponents of
the criticality dimension certainly do not eschew these important individual facets
of critical thinking entirely (indeed, they endorse their importance), the “criticality”
perspective adds something new. It adds the dimension of action to the mix. This
is represented by the addition of the social-cultural axis (the “X” axis) of critical
thinking shown below, and in what I note here as “Critical Doing”.
However, given our earlier discussion, there is more to it than action. Unlike
the views of critical thinking as adumbrated by proponents of the critical thinking
movement—what I might call—Critical Thinking proper (e.g., the work of Ennis,
McPeck, Siegel, Paul and others), for the criticality theorists the ethical dimension
is also important to critical thinking. Ethical decisions are, of course, usually (if
not always) accompanied by ethical actions. This is represented by the critical
virtue axis below. Note in the diagram that the CTM, with few exceptions, does not
include the action and morality dimension in their considerations of critical thinking.
Therefore these axes do not intersect with the CTM, though they do intersect with
the CM.
It is important to stress that those sympathetic to criticality do not disregard
argumentation skills, and critical thinking dispositions as in any way unimportant,
dispensable, misleading or redundant. These, they agree, are central features of
critical thinking. Indeed, the shaded bloc representing the criticality account below
overlaps these axes of critical thinking in the diagram. However, “criticality”, as they
understand it, comprises far more than critical thinking, it also involves doing. This,
they feel, is under-reported and not acknowledged as it should be. Unlike the CTM,
the CM includes critical actions and critical virtue as additional facets of criticality.
These dimensions too must be included in any adequate account of critical thinking
as it applies to higher education. I shall revisit the axis diagram below yet again
following a brief discussion of another facet of critical thinking in higher education,
namely, critical pedagogy (Fig. 2.6).
Critical Thinking as Critical Pedagogy
(The “Skills-Plus-Dispositions-Plus-Actions-Plus-Social
Relations” View)
Critical pedagogy is defined as the use of higher education to overcome and
“unlearn” the social conditions that restrict and limit human freedom. According to
one of its major proponents, it is ‘an educational movement, guided by passion and
principle, to help students develop consciousness of freedom, recognize authoritar-
ian tendencies, and connect knowledge to power, and the ability to take constructive
action’ especially in relation to education and society at large (Giroux, 2010).
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Fig. 2.6 Axis diagram: the critical thinking and “Criticality” movements
Like the approach taken by Barnett, Johnston, and others in their account of
“criticality”, critical pedagogy takes the view that critical thinking needs to be
broadened beyond skills and dispositions. It sees the account of critical thinking
as comprising skills-plus-dispositions as a view very much concerned with the
individual. Like the adherents of the criticality approach, however, the critical
pedagogues include the importance of action. However, unlike adherents of the
criticality approach, they consider social relations—not merely actions—to be a
vital factor for critical thinking. This broadens the notion of critical thinking even
further than any of the views previously discussed. This broadening, depending on
one’s perspective, either illuminates or confuses the discussion about the nature of
critical thinking as we shall see.
This is clearly an extension of Barnett’s account of the radically transformed
student; indeed, it extends radical educational transformation to society at large.
The critical pedagogues see critical thinking to be not about argument analysis, nor
dispositions, nor individual actions (although these too are important). They see
critical thinking to be principally about ‘the critique of lived social and political
realities to allow greater freedom of thought and action’ (Kaplan, 1991, p. 362).
From Marxism, they borrow the concept of political and economic oppression, and
the need to liberate human freedom; from psychoanalysis, they take the importance
2 A Model of Critical Thinking in Higher Education 71
of the decoding of cultural forms of knowledge; from phenomenology, the imbibe
the idea of “lived experience” (Kaplan, 1991). This concatenation of theories and
ideas results in a view of critical thinking that is a further extension and corrective
to earlier accounts described in this paper.
The key theorists in this area are Freire (1972), McLaren and Hammer (1989) and
Giroux (1994, 2005). In an illuminating article by Burbules and Berk (1999), the
following distinctions are made between the critical thinking movement (incorpo-
rating the “skills-based” view of critical thinking and the “skills-plus-dispositions”
view), and the critical pedagogy movement. I will overview these distinctions before
returning to my developing model.
The Aim of Critical Thinking
The critical thinking movement begins from a view of seeing the critical person as a
‘critical consumer of information’ (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 48). This involves
using his or her rationality to adjudicate between truth and falsehood, identify
hasty generalisations, expose unreliable authority, distinguish between reliable and
unreliable information, to carry out argument analysis, and so on. The aim of
the movement is to create taxonomies of the skills and dispositions required to
achieve the aim of being critical thinkers and to use and inculcate those skills and
dispositions in teaching. This naturally emphasises the role that higher education can
play in incorporating these skills, and cultivating these dispositions in the classroom.
The aim of the critical thinking movement—at least during its first “wave”—was to
put formal and informal logic at the service of pursuing clear and dispassionate
thinking (Paul, 2011).
The critical pedagogy movement (CPM) begins from a very different starting
point. The first-wave theorists took the adjective “critical” to mean “criticism” (i.e.,
pointing out weaknesses with a view to correcting some claim or argument). Their
aim was putting logic at the service of clear thinking. The critical pedagogues,
by contrast, took “critical” to mean “critique” (i.e., identifying other dimensions
of meaning that might be missing or concealed behind some claim or argument)
(Kaplan, 1991, p. 362). Their aim puts logic at the service of transforming
undemocratic societies and inequitable power structures. Their aim is not simply
educating for critical thinking, but educating for radical pedagogy. They see the
critical person as a reactionary against the ideological hegemony of capitalism; a
hegemony which foists conditions favourable to the maintenance of the capitalist
system onto unwitting members of society. They see advertising, for example, as
encouraging and fostering increased material consumption whilst simultaneously
reinforcing the myth that large corporations are there to serve their customers, when
they are, in fact, serving their own interests, and maximising profit, often at the
expense of both customers and the social good (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 50).
The critical pedagogy movement sees higher education, as it stands, as part
of the entrenched capitalist ideology that reinforces and legitimizes these social
conditions. This occurs in a number of ways, most obviously in “the banking
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concept of education” in which ‘education : : : becomes an act of depositing, in
which the students are the depositories, and the teacher is the depositor’ (Freire,
1972, p. 363; Kaplan, 1991). On this account, the student is assumed to be both
ignorant and a supplicant. It can also be seen in the emphasis of higher education in
producing—not intellectually-challenged—but vocationally-trained workers ready-
made for a capitalist social system; i.e., pliable minions conforming to social
expectations and meeting socio-political ends.
It can also be seen in the direction taken by the “corporate” university of the
twenty-first century in viewing education as a marketable “product” and seeing
students as “consumers” or “clients” The emphasis on “accountability” and renewed
emphasis on testing in the contemporary higher education can also be seen as a
feature of a consumer-driven model of the modern university. This has recently been
disparagingly described as a “Sat-Nav” educational system: a commoditized system
of exchange between universities and their “customers” that results in a failure of
tertiary institutions to provide real intellectual challenges to students in a way which
erodes institutional educational integrity (Cowden & Singh, 2013).
The critical pedagogues are stridently opposed to such moves, and see critical
thinking as a means of reacting to this direction in higher education today. They
believe that the aim of education should, instead, be about turning students against
the idea of being trained for the economic needs of large corporations. This can
be achieved by making students and their teachers more reactionary—to create
“critical intellectuals” (Giroux, 1988). This is clearly a very different, although no
less important, sense of “critical thinking” than we have looked at to date.
This attitude toward the corporate university, i.e., its serving an entrenched
capitalist, socio-political agenda, is no mere socialist paranoia on the part of
the critical pedagogy movement. It is worth noting again that as recently as
2012, there was strident opposition to the teaching of critical thinking skills, and
any other higher order thinking skills: ‘which focus on behaviour modification
and have the purpose of challenging the students’ fixed beliefs and undermining
parental authority’. This opposition to critical thinking in the classroom was part
of the Texas-based Republican party platform, an official policy that was widely
condemned and quickly retracted (Cuban, 1984, p. 12; Morse, 2012; Strauss, 2012).
So there is some basis for the critical pedagogy moment as being concerned about
the existing political aims of higher education. They see it as already serving a
fraught socio-political agenda. They would see the recent republican attack on
critical thinking is evidence of it.
The critical pedagogy movement sees the role of higher education, not as
reinforcing, but as dispelling these uncritical attitudes and questioning these
assumptions. They see the role of higher education as working within higher
educational institutions to identify and critique power inequities in society, the
myths of opportunity in capitalist economies, and ‘the way belief systems become
internalized to the point where individuals and groups abandon the very aspiration
to question or change their lot in life’ (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 50). “Thinking
critically”, for them, is not principally a matter of cultivating certain skills and
dispositions, but recognizing, and critiquing, pedagogical relations in society that
maintain the capitalist status quo.
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Critical Thinking for Action
Another difference between the critical thinking skills movement and the critical
pedagogy movement is the commitment to action. I have already identified the
importance of action in the previous section.
As we have seen, the authoritative definition of critical thinking widely adopted
by many in the critical thinking movement assumes—but does not formalise—
a commitment to action. Ennis’ definition of critical thinking as ‘reasonable
reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do’ assumes ‘an overly
direct connection between reasons and action’, and that “believing” will lead
unproblematically to “doing” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 52). We have seen that
this point highlights strains within the critical thinking movement, and a launching
point for the work of Barnett (1997) and his analysis of the tripartite account of
critical thinking, critical reflection, and critical action.
Like Barnett, the critical pedagogy movement sees action as an intrinsic, not
separable, aspect of critical thinking. However, they take critical action much
further. They see action as important not merely for encouraging personal individual
reaction to events before one, but as a justification for wholesale social and political
change. As Burbules and Berk put it, for them: ‘challenging thought and practice
must occur together : : : criticality requires praxis—both reflection and action, both
interpretation and change : : : Critical Pedagogy would never find it sufficient to
reform the habits of thought of thinkers, however effectively, without challenging
and transforming the institutions, ideologies, and relations that engender distorted,
oppressed thinking in the first place—not an additional act beyond the pedagogical
one, but an inseparable part of it’ (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 52).
Teaching for a Critical Mindset
Another difference between the two movements is this: The critical thinking
movement sees the objective of teaching critical thinking skills and dispositions as
conditions for fermenting a critical mindset among students as part of a general
agenda for improving the aims of higher education. They see teaching critical
thinking as allowing students to distinguish between truth and falsity; misleading
and doctrinal information; and alerting them to fallacies of thought and flawed
assumptions. They see critical thinking as an emancipatory practice of providing
tools for students to “think for themselves” and “form their own conclusions”.
The critical pedagogy movement, however, sees the teaching of critical thinking
very differently. They see it as a way of alerting students to their indoctrination and
their role in serving an entrenched capitalist political system. Moreover, they see the
role of teaching critical thinking as alerting them to the social conditions that have
led to this.
For the critical thinking movement, this is a flawed attitude. It amounts to taking
for granted and prejudging the conclusions to an issue. It is itself equivalent to
indoctrination. However, for the critical pedagogy movement, raising the issue of the
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social conditions of freedom is essential to critical thinking. “True” critical thinking,
for them, involves liberation from an oppressive system as a condition of freedom
of thought. As Burbules and Berk put it: ‘Critical thinking’s claim is, at heart, to
teach how to think critically, not how to teach politically; for Critical Pedagogy, this
is a false distinction : : : self-emancipation is contingent upon social emancipation’
(Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 55). In the words of the “Critical Pedagogy Collective”
(echoing Dewey): ‘Education is not preparation for life—education is life itself’
(The Critical Pedagogy Collective, 2013).
Critical Thinking as Conformity
It will be clear by now that the aims of the critical thinking movement and the critical
pedagogy movement are very different. They form different axes on our diagram
as we shall see. These differences mean that the one movement sees the other in
often hostile terms (Burbules & Berk, 1999, pp. 53–54). However, I suggest that
these hostilities amount to being axis disputes. They amount to seeing alternative
perspectives of critical thinking from the vantage points very different from one’s
own. More on this later.
In not directly addressing political concerns, the proponent of critical pedagogy
sees the objectives of the critical thinking movement as being evidence for (uncrit-
ical) conformity to a certain social system. In their view, by being politically and
socially impartial, the critical thinking movement ignores one of the central reasons
for the necessity of critical thinking. According to the critical pedagogy movement,
the critical thinking movement ‘enshrine[s] many conventional assumptions as
presented by the popular media, traditional textbooks, etc., in a manner that,
intentionally or not, teaches political conformity’ (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 56).
By contrast, the critical thinking movement sees the critical pedagogy movement
as dogmatically “uncritical” about their own major assumption, i.e., that the socio-
political system is the reason for the oppression of the working class, and evidence
of many of the social ills in society today.
The following table summarises and clarifies some of the differences between
the two movements in relation to critical thinking (CT) (Table 2.3).
The Axis Diagram Revisited Again
Now we have looked at the critical pedagogy movement (CPM) and distinguished
it from the tradition of the critical thinking movement we can position it too on our
axis diagram (see below).
The critical pedagogy perspective clearly comes under our category of “Critical
Doing” as does the criticality movement. The reason for this is that both emphasize
action. However, unlike the criticality movement, which has a non-specific and
undirected use of the term “action”, the critical pedagogy movement is strident in
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Table 2.3 A comparison between the critical thinking movement and the critical pedagogy
movement
Critical thinking movement
(CTM)
Critical pedagogy movement
(CPM)
Aim of CT To use reasonable and rational
reflection to interpret the
world, resulting in the
liberation of the intellect
To emancipate people from
oppressive conditions of the
capitalist system, resulting in
the liberation of political
consciousness, leading to
political praxis
Scope of CT To cultivate critical thinking
skills and dispositions, e.g., to
bring about ‘reasonable,
reflective thinking focussed
on deciding what to believe or
do’
To bring about social action
to overcome—or at least
question and
critique—oppressive social
conditions (“relations of
domination”)
Involvement To use others (teachers, fellow
students, resources) as a
means to cultivating cognitive
skills and critical dispositions
To use dialogue as a means of
developing confidence,
literacy, and thereby
eliminating powerlessness
Purpose of teaching CT To teach critical thinking
skills and dispositions with a
view to creating better
thinkers
To bring about social justice:
to make students aware of
indoctrination, and the social
conditions that led to this,
with a view to allowing them
to escape them
Agenda of CT None: cultural, moral, ethical,
political issues are precluded
as necessary topics for
discussion (Critical thinking
can be done in principle using
abstract formal mathematical
entities and variables, e.g., ‘p’
and ‘q’.)
Political issues are essential
to critical thinking and are the
reasons why it is vital to do
and promote critical thinking
Attitude “Impartiality” on issues is a
key virtue and is itself a
critical thinking disposition
“Impartiality” on issues is
evidence of domination and
oppression
Wider context Non-relational. Social and
political context is
independent of critical
thinking (though of course
proponents of the CTM are
concerned about social
conditions)
Relational. Social and
political context is intrinsic to
critical thinking
Criticism of the other CPM is blind to critical
thinking about own premises
and assumptions
CTM is insufficiently aware
of its own political
conformity
Adapted from Burbules and Berk (1999)
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its calls for a specific form of action (and specifically, action in relation to social
conditions). I shall call this “Critical Participation”. “Doing”, in an abstract sense,
might be merely undirected, or pointless. “Participation” carries with it a sense of
purposeful doing. It carries with it more of a sense of engagement than simply
critical doing. It requires engagement with the thing one is acting for, in relation to,
or on behalf of. As we have seen, in the case of the critical pedagogues, this “doing”
is related to the questioning and reconfiguration of oppressive social conditions.
This is central to the aim of theorists such as Freire, Giroux, McLaren and others.
But it is also central to related socio-cultural agendas. “Critical participation” is
also the natural home for the critical citizenship theorists, and those sympathetic to
critical feminist approaches to critical thinking, with their emphasis on criticality
as a socially constructed phenomenon, which is inextricably connected to the
process of becoming a member of a certain community. Indeed, the metaphor of
“participation” is often used in this connection (Salomon & Perkins, 1998; Sfard,
1998; Ten Dam & Volman, 2004).
Note that “Critical Participation” is oriented on our diagram spatially closer to
the category of “Critical Doing” compared to the category of “Critical Rationality”
(it has a stronger “outer” than an “inner” focus). It is positioned closer to the “X”
axis. However, again, there is a difference in the degree of commitment here. The
“participation” facet of criticality, in turn, has two dimensions: (1) awareness of
oppression (known in the literature “critical consciousness” or—as it is known in
the critical pedagogy literature—conscientization (Freire, 1972, 1973); and (2) a
more practical dimension, the resistance to oppression (demonstrably, to “resist”
something one needs to be aware of what one is resisting). This is sometimes known
in the critical pedagogy literature as praxis. Both these vectors are represented in the
diagram below (Fig. 2.7).
To the critical pedagogues, the action of resistance to oppressive conditions,
by means of action against (amongst other things) educational indoctrination is
essential. However, this commitment is foreign to the aim of proponents of the
critical thinking movement (even if they happen to agree with it in principle). The
CTM (the “Y” axis), in fact, appears neutral with respect to social conditions.
Reactionary views on educational oppression have little, if anything, to do with
the literature on critical thinking per se. Discussions of the cognitive and propensity
elements of critical thinking, it seems, can and is often discussed independently of
the socio-cultural axis of criticality.
However, this separation of concerns belies deep similarities. As Burbules
and Berk note: ‘each invokes the term “critical” as a valued educational goal:
urging teachers to help students become more skeptical toward commonly accepted
truisms. Each says, in its own way, “Don’t let yourself be deceived”. And each
has sought to reach and influence particular groups of educators : : : They share a
passion and sense of urgency about the need for more critically oriented classrooms.
Yet with very few exceptions these literatures do not discuss one another’ (Burbules
& Berk, 1999, p. 45).
The fact that the respective literatures do not “discuss each other” is no reason
not to include them both in a comprehensive overview of the relative concerns of
those interested in critical thinking. I have tried to do this in this paper. Seeing these
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Fig. 2.7 The critical pedagogy movement
respective concerns as different axes or dimensions on one model of critical thinking
in higher education, in fact, has intrinsic benefits. It helps in understanding where—
in the panoply of possible positions on critical thinking on offer—various theorists
are located. It also helps in unraveling axis disputes and axis alignments. For
example, note that the critical pedagogy movement is largely disinterested in the
concerns of the critical thinking movement, and vice-versa (the shaded sectors in
the diagram do not overlap). However, there are synergies between the CPM and
the criticality movement as indicated by their focus on action. All these concerns
are demonstrably relevant to critical thinking in higher education, broadly conceived
even if there may be dramatic differences in matters of detail. The model helps us
see these differences. I shall consider another important axis dispute at the end of
the paper.
Critical Thinking as Thinking Differently (The “Creativity”
View)
Where to from here? Burbules and Berk, interestingly, see the widening and deep-
ening of critical thinking in terms of “criticality”, and thence “critical pedagogy”, to
hold promise for yet another important sense of “critical thinking”. In a section of
their paper headed ‘Towards an alternate criticality’, they attempt to articulate such
an account by focusing on the phenomenon of critical thinking as practice. They call
this account “Critical thinking as thinking differently”. I shall call it critical thinking
as creativity or openness (CAC/O). This account is necessarily rather speculative,
but it seems to hold promise of a unique and coherent account of its own. As I am
aiming to provide a comprehensive model of critical thinking in higher education, I
should include it.
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Burbules and Berk see various movements in the critical thinking literature in
terms of any other ideology, e.g., Marxism, fascism, and so on. They claim that
all ideologies have an unavoidable appeal and presence; a presence which has a
hold over people who are sympathetic to their world-view. All ideologies influence
us to the extent that they make us prepared to ignore features of phenomena that
lie outside the purview of a given ideology. This, they rightly note, is the main
characteristic of ideologies.
Burbules and Berk claim that both the critical thinking movement and the critical
pedagogy movement are each themselves examples of an “ideology”. Neither is
willing to acknowledge the virtues and place of the other as legitimate contenders
in any discussion about the nature of critical thinking. Both are concerned with
their own preservation. Both are concerned with their own ‘reification and stasis’
and lack reflective criticism about their limitations. They ‘lack : : : opportunities to
think differently : : : and are less able—and less motivated—to pull up their own
roots for examination’ (1999, p. 61).
They suggest that this recognition—i.e., that theories about critical thinking are
themselves ideologies—is a basis for a new way of thinking about critical thinking.
The potential for doing so opens the prospect of seeing critical thinking as ‘a way
of being as well as a way of thinking’ (1999, p. 62 italics added). By this they mean
that critical thinking is as much a way of thinking about arguments, dispositions,
actions and social relations, as a way of being creative and “open to challenges” of
thinking anew (1999, p. 60). True critical thinking, for them, is about not being
“closed off”. It, instead, begs a requirement for “openness”. This, for Burbules
and Berk, does not amount to a relativist thesis (the view that all perspectives
are equally valid) it amounts to appreciating that un-reconciled (and irreconcilable)
tensions exist between different perspectives on critical thinking. Critical thinking
as creativity, in their view, also means finding these tensions agreeable, and not
being perpetually unsatisfied by them. It is in ‘remaining open to challenges without
seeking to dissipate them that criticality reveals its value as a way of life’ (1999,
p. 62). It requires a willingness to ‘move against the grain of convention’ (1999,
p. 62). Hence, they use the phrase “critical thinking as thinking differently”, thinking
creatively, or—as it might also be termed—critical thinking as openness (CAC/O).
This kind of thesis might be rejected out of hand as being unclear. However,
I shall embrace their exhortation to think differently on the question of critical
thinking as it applies to higher education. I believe coherent sense can be made
of their suggestion by adopting insights from the cognitive sciences. Perhaps a
case can be made that true critical thinking only occurs if the whole fibre of one’s
personality/physical body/consciousness/emotions as well as actions are involved.
That is, critical thinking is not merely rational/intellectual/definitional/judgmental,
but nor is it simply disassociated bodily actions in response to reasoned decision-
making. “True” critical thinking might be all of these things and more. In particular,
it might include thinking that involves a number of facets of cognition not easily
understood in terms of the axes of skills, judgments, dispositions and actions as
previously outlined. These features of thinking include expertise in pattern and
similarity recognition, common sense understanding, skilled “know-how” (in the
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Rylean sense), an ability of seeing situational salience (where some real-world
events are instantaneously, and unconsciously, perceived as more important than
others), and what is known as deliberative rationality (i.e., the ability to use expertise
to interpret new events in terms of past experience and to make instantaneous,
unconscious, confident decisions based on them). All of the above are familiar in
the cognitive science literature as the “six aspects of intuitive judgment” (Dreyfus &
Dreyfus, 1985). This kind of thinking, in short, is intuitive thinking, a very different
kind of thinking to that discussed earlier. This, along with creative thinking, surely
has a strong relationship to critical thinking (Paul & Elder, 2008). Unfortunately,
however, there has been very little work done on this.
Intuitive thinking occurs only when a great deal of reasoning, and practice
with reasoning, assessment of evidence, and so on has already occurred. Intuitive
thinking is based on past decisions grounded in sound, well-established principles
of critical thinking. However intuitive thinking is marked by the thinker having
gone beyond conscious intellectual consideration of their judgments and decision-
making. This kind of thinking involves having constructed a large number of
cognitive patterns from which to make immediate, unconscious “intuitive” calls
to action. This phenomenon is common amongst “expert” thinkers in a range of
professions (Ericsson, 2008; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). For experts, intellectual
consideration has become incorporated into bodily consideration and action as an
intuitive response. A sportsman effortlessly and unconsciously “knows” how to play
the ball, or take a tackle; the musician just “knows” how to phrase the passage, and
so on.
In this sense, “true” critical thinking must necessarily be “open” in relation to all
influences. It involves thinking differently—being trans-critical—i.e., thinking with
the core of one’s body and being—not merely thinking intellectually. This does
not mean trans-rational (beyond reason), rather, it means rational thinking albeit
not thinking that involves conscious analytical methods of decision-making (Franz,
2003). As noted, this phenomenon has a parallel in the area of sports, music and
other areas, and is sometimes known as “the Zone” or the phenomenon of “flow”
(Cooper, 2009; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Its characteristic features are a heightened
sense of mastery and emotional buoyancy.
At first blush this might seem completely counter to critical thinking. However,
in outlining the perspectives of the various traditional accounts of critical thinking
in this paper, it might be noted that all of them to date (with possible exception
of the account by Burbules and Berk) neglect the importance of the role of the
intuition and creativity in critical thinking. This seems to us to be an oversight. The
importance of intuitive thinking, intuitive reasoning—thinking trans-critically—
is becoming increasingly important to the cognitive sciences and brain science
research, with published studies arising on the role of intuitive reasoning in areas
as diverse as expert sports performance, chess-playing, judgment-making in nursing
and other professions, management decision-making, and solving physics problems
(Benner & Tanner, 1987; Dane & Pratt, 2007; Effken, 2000; Ericsson, 2008; Larkin,
McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980; Lieberman, 2000).
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Intuition is sometimes defined as ‘understanding without a rationale’ (Benner &
Tanner, 1987, p. 23). But this would be to underplay its significant role in brain
processing. The evidence so far adduced from the cognitive sciences seems to
indicate that creative “intuition” is no mysterious process as it is often assumed
to be, but a process involving the cognitive agent being able to unconsciously
search across knowledge domains and indexed patterns of reliable information in
a fraction of a second to access relevant parts of an established information store
(Franz, 2003). It involves the expert’s body being part of engagement in the world;
a form of “knowing how” in which tools and objects become—in a Heideggerian
sense—extensions of the their own body (as when a nurse, for example, feels an
intravenous catheter to be ‘an extension of her fingers, not an unwieldy foreign
object’ (Benner & Tanner, p. 26)). Evidence suggests that this form of thinking—
intuitive thinking—is more efficient, and accurate, than conventional thinking
involving reasoned weighing up of alternatives (Lieberman, 2000, p. 109). A more
accurate definition suggests that intuitive thinking be considered ‘the subjective
experience associated with the use of knowledge gained through implicit learning’
(Lieberman, p. 109), or as a ‘phenomenological and behavioural correlate of implicit
learning’ (Lieberman, p. 126). Sometimes intuitive thinking is seen in terms of
“thin slicing” (Gladwell, 2005). This is the remarkable capacity of humans who,
instantaneously, and without conscious effort, can sift through a situation, zero in
on what is salient, throw everything out that is not relevant, and act accordingly. It
would be remiss of researchers not to consider the importance of intuitive thinking
for any complete account of critical thinking.
Moreover, there is a point of consistency to consider. We have seen, in the taxon-
omy of the various positions I have provided, how the framework of criticality has
been be extended from (initially) a very narrow account of skills in argumentation,
to the importance of including broader cognitive skills, actions and emotions, and
then the inclusion of dispositions, actions, social relations, and now creativity. Each
development has consisted of an expansion of the conception of critical thinking for
higher education. It is not a difficult step to imagine the need to include creative
intuitions as well. However, I am not suggesting this as an additional account of
criticality to that already proposed. I am suggesting that intuitive critical thinking is
already implicit in the account of creative critical thinking (CAC/O).
The CAC/O view just outlined can be compared with Barnett’s example of the
Chinese Tank Man provided earlier as an exemplar of critical being, and noted also
as an example of critical action (see p. ?). As noted then, the man’s actions clearly
were not entirely intellectual in nature (indeed, had he had thought critically about
it he surely would not have done it). His sizing up of the situation and acting was
an intuitive act—an organic critical response to the context. His action was the
opposite of weighing an argument, assessing it dispassionately, etc. It was in another
vector space to critical thinking as argumentation (the “Y” axis in our axis diagram).
Just as a mother would not even think about a brave, unself-serving action to protect
her off-spring in response to a perceived danger—or an accomplished sportsperson
would not even need to think how to make the play—so too, a “true” critical
thinker responds intuitively with organic, bodily responses. Conscious intellect is
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suspended: they are not convinced of the rightness of their actions, intellectually-
speaking, as much as responding instinctively and intuitively to what they need to
do. The cognitive science literature suggests this is a real phenomenon.
To what extent this idea is a coherent notion, and to what extent it constitutes
a valuable contribution to critical thinking theory remains to be seen. However,
it has clear similarities to Barnett’s valuable notion of critical being. I therefore
propose this as having a location in the final contribution to our axis diagram below
(as the “X” axis in our diagram). It shows how critical openness is premised on the
importance of intuition as part of critical thinking, i.e., criticality as critical being.
The latter is represented in the model as a diametrically opposed vector space than
the CTM.
The location of critical creativity on the diagram shows how the perspective
of critical thinking and openness keeps “open” all previous views of critical
thinking (hence the lines representing all forms of critical thinking intersect
through the shaded block). By contrast, the CTM only has argumentation/skills and
abilities/disposition lines intersecting in its shaded block. Thus, while the CTM is
very narrow in its focus the alternative, (CAC/O), is open to all influences. This
makes the CTM more easily understood as an account of critical thinking and
more productive in its output. It also means that the alternative—critical thinking
as creativity or openness (CAC/O)—seems, on the surface, to be woolly and less
clear. But this does not make the latter wrong. To suggest otherwise is another
potential axis dispute from the narrow perspective of protagonists aligned with, and
sympathetic to, a different dimension of critical thinking, a different critical thinking
“ideology”.
It is for future work to determine whether this account of the various positions on
critical thinking can be maintained. I submit it as part of a model of critical thinking
that helps to make sense of a variety of considerations in the critical thinking in
higher education literature. The final iteration of the axis diagram is given below
(Fig. 2.8).
A Practical Example
How can these various positions on critical thinking be explained using a simple
example? By using and extending the example of a lawyer, used earlier, we can
see a number of discrete stages involved in the process of being a critical thinker.
For completeness sake, I include the first six stages representing Bloom’s famous
taxonomy (the final three stages approximating cognitive critical thinking skills).
In addition, we can see the locus of interest of all the major views about critical
thinking. Given what has been outlined earlier, it is important to note that the
examples below are not indicative of discrete “stages” or “levels”, but rather
overlapping dimensions. What I have called “axis disputes” can occur between
dimensions (Table 2.4).
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Fig. 2.8 The individual and socio-cultural elements of critical thinking
A Model of Critical Thinking in Higher Education
The enterprise of critical thinking in higher education, I submit, can be seen in terms
of a series of concentric circles (see Fig. 2.9). I propose this as a model for critical
thinking in Higher Education.
Explaining the Model
What is the relationship between the axis diagram and the circles diagram? The
circles diagram constitutes my model of critical thinking in higher education. The
axis diagram was necessary getting us to that point. It was important as a preparatory
stage in outlining, in a visual way, the various accounts of critical thinking; it showed
the geography or terrain of the various positions in relation to one another. Ideally,
the model proposed should be 3D, including the various axes. However, it is also
important that the model of critical thinking represents the disparate perspective
as of a piece; as comprising Wittgensteinian “family resemblances” as it were—
aspects of a single concept in use. This is because critical thinking, while complex,
is one phenomenon. All the positions on critical thinking, while occupying different
vector spaces on the model, contribute something different to our understanding
of critical thinking as a single, undifferentiated (although multi-faceted) concept.
The axis diagram then can be considered a useful fiction. In a similar way, the
Bohr-Rutherford model of an atom is a useful fiction. However, both point to way
to understanding the phenomenon under investigation.
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The circles of critical thinking radiate out from a focus on the individual and his
or her cognitive skills and dispositions (the individual dimension or axis); to a focus
on the individual and his or her actions; to a focus on the individual in relation to
others in a wider social and educational context; and finally, to a focus of the social
context itself in which the individual thinker operates in a critically engaged citizen
(the socio-cultural dimension or axis). It is the latter which critical pedagogues see
as constituting oppressive social conditions in need of critique.
The “inner” circles constitute the “critical thinking movement” as it is broadly
understood to include cognitive factors and propensity elements (these are shaded
to indicate their centrality and importance to critical thinking theory as it is
understood historically). All the circles are drawn with dotted lines indicating a
degree of permeability between each level. Thus, a major figure in the CTM such as
Table 2.4 The relationship between different accounts of critical thinking in higher education
Level of Criticality Sample Case
Knowledge A lawyer can define a legal principle such as “innocent until proven guilty”.
Comprehension A lawyer can explain the purpose of a legal principle such as “innocent until
proven guilty”.
Application A lawyer can give a concrete example of a legal principle such as “innocent
until proven guilty”. 
Analysis A lawyer can compare and contrast the application of a given principle such as
“innocent until proven guilty” in relation to a number of legal cases.
Synthesis A lawyer can classify and assess the likely or probable outcome of a legal
case as a result of the application of a legal principle such as “innocent until
proven guilty”.
Evaluation A lawyer can make a judgment about, and draw conclusions about, the
outcome of a legal decision in relation to the application of a legal principle
such as “innocent until proven guilty” and can deliberate on the value and 
worth of the principle itself.
Critical action A lawyer can act on a legal principle such as “innocent until proven guilty” 
(i.e., the lawyer can do more than analyse, synthesise and evaluate, they can 
engage in concrete actions in relation to the principle). This demonstrates 
more than critical thinking,it demonstrates critical character (acting on 
principle). However, these actions need not necessarily be in relation to a 
fair and just cause.
Critical virtue A lawyer can act virtuously on a legal principle such as “innocent until proven
guilty” by defending a client whom they believe is truly worthy of defence, and
refusing to act in relation to unworthy cases. This is to be distinguished from
merely engaging in concrete actions in order to win cases (i.e., with no moral
compunction at all). 
Bloom’s taxonomy
Critical 
Thinking 
Movement
Criticality
Movement
(continued)
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Table 2.4 (continued)
Critical
consciousness 
A lawyer can be cognisant of wider inequities beyond legal principles such as
“innocent until proven guilty”. These wider inequities are a result of social
conditions occurring beyond the case in question that might have an impact
on the clients’ case. The lawyer is thereby concerned about the root causes of the
situation that led to the case as much as the case itself.
Critical pedagogy A lawyer is prepared to take a stand on the wider social injustices/root causes
that arise in relation to legal principles such as “innocent until proven guilty” as
they might apply in relation to his/her client. The lawyer does not thereby merely
act virtuously in relation to his/her case. Instead, he/she is prepared to act
virtuously in relation to wider social concerns. In particular, this means
changing the educational system that lead to the inequities. 
Critical Being A lawyer no longer sees his/her case as merely acting in relation to an application
of legal principle such as “innocent until proven guilty” in relation to a client.
He/she is past the stages of critical analysis, synthesis and evaluation and action.
He/she is convinced of the rightness of his/her judgments and the urgency of
doing something about it. He/she is wholly absorbed in the fullest sense in the
wrongfulness of the situation. He/she is instinctively responsive to the situation
and is prepared to do anything to remedy it. The clients’ case has become a
secondary concern. The issue has become central to the lawyer’s life.
Critical 
Pedagogy 
Movement
Critical
‘Openness’
R. H. Ennis, who initially focused on defining critical thinking as a cognitive skill,
‘as the correcting assessing of statements’ (the innermost circle), has modified his
stance to incorporate critical thinking judgments and dispositions, i.e., ‘reasonable,
reflective thinking focused on what to believe or do’. Thus, his account has shifted
from the inner-most circle to the second. This indicates some natural evolution in
his perspective. (He also countenances dispositions, and therefore can be located in
the third circle as well.) Similarly, other theorists have modified their initial views,
usually adopting “wider” perspectives from that they held originally.
These different concerns of the various critical thinking movements are, respec-
tively:
1. Critical thinking as (a) cognitive skills and (b) judgments, i.e., critical thinking
as argumentation and reflection (The cognitive dimension);
2. Critical thinking as each of these in addition to affective factors, i.e., dispositions,
emotions, attitudes and state of readiness (the propensity dimension);
3. Critical thinking as all of these in addition to actions (the “criticality” dimen-
sion);
4. Critical thinking as all of these in addition to social relations (the “critical
pedagogy” dimension).
Finally, Burbules and Berk (1999) offer the prospect of a fifth dimension—a sixth
circle—of critical thinking as creativity (CAC/O). This account of critical thinking
in higher education, however, is highly speculative and undeveloped at this point.
I suggested a naturalist reading of this suggestion consistent with their notion of
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Fig. 2.9 A model of critical thinking in higher education
critical thinking as creativity. This intriguing idea needs sustained discussion that I
cannot attempt here.
The three innermost circles (argumentation, judgments, and dispositions) con-
stitute the critical thinking movement as it is generally understood, i.e., as a
movement consisting mainly of educational philosophers seeking to define and
create taxonomies of the concept of “critical thinking”. These innermost circles
have a focus on critical thinking at the individual level. The fifth and sixth circles
focus on critical thinking at the social level. The fourth circle is an intermediate
stage constituting what I have referred to as the “criticality movement”, although
this cause is fairly new, and is not identified as such in the literature. This is a
group of scholars consisting mainly of higher education specialists interested in the
wider ramifications of critical thinking for higher education, tertiary institutions,
and society at large. The fifth circle constitutes a movement of educational radicals
working at the intersection of philosophy, higher education, pedagogy, and politics.
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This is what is customarily known as the critical pedagogy movement. The sixth
outermost circle is constitutive of a possible extension of the scholarship of critical
thinking into a stage of intuitive thinking and critical being, but remains under-
developed.
Historically, the concerns of the critical pedagogues (fifth circle) have been
seen by philosophers in the critical thinking movement (three innermost circles)
as having concerns that are tangential and oblique to their main aims. As Burbules
and Berk put it, they would regard the concern for social inequity, inequality and
disenfranchisement, as important, but ‘subsidiary to the more inclusive problem
of people basing their life choices on unsubstantiated truth claims—a problem
that is non-partisan in its nature or effects’ (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p. 46). In
other words, for proponents of the critical thinking movement, the definitional
and justification issues associated with critical thinking come first; politics comes
second. However, importantly, as our model suggests, this is a matter of preference
and emphasis. It is an axis dispute. There is no a priori reason why scholars
cannot investigate critical thinking along all dimensions outlined simultaneously;
indeed, a fully satisfactory account of critical thinking in higher education—as
opposed to a localized, philosophical treatment of critical thinking—will need to
run orthogonally to the circles and not be confined in the “orbit” of any particular
dimension.
Advantages of the Model
There are at least three main advantages offered by the model.
Firstly, the model also helps us see, at a glance, how those working in the area
relate to each other. Key proponents of each position are shown in the diagram
with their approximate locus indicated. Ennis and colleagues are centrally-placed
in the cognitive “skills”-based camp, though, as noted, many of these thinkers also
sympathetic to the dispositional approach (hence the shaded section which extends
out to the third circle). Paul is an outlier in this camp, as he has demonstrated a
willingness to consider social ramifications and concerns (Burbules & Berk, 1999,
pp. 50, 53). Barnett and Johnston are representatives of the “criticality” movement
circle demonstrating their commitment to critical action as a vital part of critical
thinking in higher education, and their concern with the role of critical thinking
in society, i.e., educating for participation in the world as a critical, engaged
citizen (although not a radicalized citizen railing against oppression). The social
pedagogues, Friere, Grioux, McLaren and others, are even further out, tangential
to, and largely unconcerned with, the “skills” debate. They are firmly located in
the circle that commits to social relations being an essential part of radical critical
thinking. The outermost circle is the home of those which see critical thinking as an
open, creative pursuit. This view captures the notion of critical thinking as intuitive,
trans-critical responsiveness.
Secondly, the model promises a rapprochement of sorts between the critical
thinking movement (the three innermost circles) and the critical pedagogy move-
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ment (fifth circle). This is by means of the fourth, intermediary and connecting
circle. The emphasis placed by Barnett and others on “criticality”—as opposed
to critical thinking or critical pedagogy—provides a point on which both par-
ties can agree, and on which they can leverage their respective interests. Like
those in the “criticality” movement, proponents of the critical thinking movement
acknowledge—albeit inadequately account for—the importance of action. Like-
wise, the proponents of the critical pedagogy movement seem to acknowledge—
indeed, mandate—the importance of a wider, social context of critical thinking.
Proponents of the criticality movement sit astride both views: neither wanting to
fully adopt a radical politico-social agenda, nor wanting to reduce critical thinking to
argumentation, judgments and dispositions. Criticality theorists might be considered
socio-politically neutral while being simultaneously dissatisfied by restrictions to
cognitive definitions of critical thinking.
Thirdly, the model helps to identify axis or boundary disputes. A long-standing
example of such a dispute is the debate between “generalist” and the “specifist”
approaches to critical thinking (Davies, 2006, 2013; Moore, 2004, 2011). Is critical
thinking best understood as a pan-disciplinary phenomenon, or is it best seen as
specific to the disciplines? No debate has polarized scholars of critical thinking more
than this. How can the model provided illuminate this issue?
The model suggests a ready, if not altogether satisfactory, resolution. If critical
thinking is seen principally in terms of developing individual skills in argumenta-
tion, judgments, and dispositions, then it is very much a general skill, congruent
with many disciplines (as all disciplines use arguments). If, on the other hand, if
critical thinking is seen as a matter of being socialized—i.e., acting and participating
in a discipline (in the same way, perhaps, as participating as a citizen in a given
society)—then this requires dedicated pedagogies for this purpose, and discipline-
specific induction. Depending on one’s initial assumptions then, critical thinking
is as much a socio-cultural issue as a matter of developing individual skills. From
this perspective both views are largely correct and the “debate” is a non-starter.
However, sometimes one view is more important for practical reasons. Educating
for criticality sometimes demands a myopic view (students need to be able to argue
effectively), and sometimes it demands a hyperopic view (students need to develop
critical membership or citizenship of certain academic communities). Sometimes
one or other requirement is preeminent, and effectively dominates the debate. This
decision can turn, not always on matters of educational principle, but on funding
decisions and resource allocation in cash-strapped tertiary institutions. In the end
what kind of student does an institution want to educate?
Axis disputes do not mean issues are any less disputes; the model makes sense
of how debates arise, it does not adjudicate between them. Theoretical models are,
likewise, no panacea. They can, however, offer the potential for moving forward in
the important area of critical thinking in Higher Education.
88 M. Davies
Conclusion
This paper has overviewed some of the major positions on the nature of critical
thinking as they apply to the discipline of Higher Education. This included
contributors to the so-called critical thinking movement, the proponents of criticality
theory, the critical pedagogues, and those working in critical citizenship and allied
fields. While the various perspectives offered on critical thinking in higher education
differ in a number of respects, the model provided helps to locate these positions,
and the scholars that hold them, in terms of their relative proximity. This might
help to avoid the problem of scholars within different fields of critical thinking
scholarship “talking past one another”. However, the model provided is only a rough
sketch. Further work needs to be done in outlining how the model can illuminate
important issues in the field. Locating various positions on a model of critical
thinking in higher education might be intrinsically interesting, but the important
work to be done is providing insight on how critical thinking can be best taught and
incorporated in the curriculum. This is where the real value of the model will be
tested.
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